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INTRODUCTION
When prominent court cases illuminate the difficult moral issues
involved in end-of-life decisions, legislatures often respond by enact-
ing statutes designed to help resolve the dilemmas that the cases raise.
For example, shortly after the NewJersey Supreme Court decided the
landmark Quinlan case' in 1976, California enacted the nation's first
living-will statute, the California Natural Death Act.2 Similarly, after
the United States Supreme Court issued its first (and only) life-sus-
taining-treatment decision in 1990,' the federal government enacted
the Patient Self-Determination Act,4 and several states passed new
end-of-life statutes or amended existing ones.5 At this point, all states
and the District of Columbia have adopted at least one of the follow-
ing kinds of statutes concerning end-of-life decisions for patients who
have lost decisionmaking capacity: living-will laws, durable power of
attorney for health care laws, do not resuscitate order laws, and health
1. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (holding that
patients have a constitutional right to have life-sustaining treatment discontinued).
2. George J. Annas, The Health Care Proxy and the Living Will 324 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1210, 1210 (1991).
3. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
4. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206 (1990);
104 Stat. 1388-115 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (1988 & Supp.
1992)).
5. See generally Fenella Rouse, The Role of State Legislatures After Cruzan: What Can-and
Should-State Legislatures Do?, 19 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 83 (1991).
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care surrogate laws.6 Some states, including Maryland, combine two
or more of these different kinds of laws into a single statute.7
This response is not surprising. Many of the court cases have
arisen due to uncertainty about the law. In addition, when courts
reach decisions about withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, they reg-
ularly observe that the legislatures, rather than the judiciary, should
be resolving the ethical and legal dilemmas posed by end-of-life deci-
sions. According to several courts, the issues involved are not well-
suited for the adversarial process, and unlike courts, legislatures have
the resources and ability to entertain and synthesize the full range of
relevant perspectives.'
Without doubt, laws dealing with end-of-life decisions have gener-
ated some benefits. They have reminded the public of the impor-
tance of considering in advance how they would wish to be medically
treated if they became terminally ill, and they have reminded physi-
cians of the importance of respecting patient preferences when mak-
ing life-sustaining treatment decisions for incompetent patients.
Yet, there are serious limitations to, and even disadvantages of,
end-of-life statutes. The statutes may mislead patients about their
rights. Even if not misleading, the statutes are unlikely to achieve the
goals of their proponents. Even the best statutes cannot ensure that
physicians understand the preferences of their patients regarding
6. See generally Choice in Dying, Inc., RIGHT-To-DIE LAw DIGEST: A QuARTERLY REVIEW
OF LEGISLATIVE AcrTvrry AND CASE LAw (1993) [hereinafter RIGHT-TO-DIE LAw DIGEST.] In
1990, the federal government enacted the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA), which
requires hospitals and other health care organizations to inform patients of their rights to
accept or refuse medical treatment and their rights to use advance directives. John La
Puma et al., Advance Directives on Admission: Clinical Implications and Analysis of the Patient
Self-Determination Act of 1990,. 266 JAMA 402, 402 (1991).
The PSDA is beyond the scope of this article. Useful articles on the PSDA include
PeterJ. Greco et al., The Patient Self-Determination Act and the Future of Advance Directives, 115
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 639 (1991);Jeremy Sugarman et al., The Cost of Ethics Legislation: A
Look at the Patient Self-Determination Act, 3 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICSJ. 387 (1993); Joan M.
Teno et al., The Impact of the Patient Self-Determination Act's Requirement that States Describe Law
Concerning Patients'Rights, 21J. L. MED. & ETHICS 102 (1993); Susan M. Wolf et al., Sources of
Concern About the Patient Self-Determination Act, 325 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1666 (1991); Practicing
the PSDA, Special Supplement, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at S1; OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PATIENT ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES: EARLY IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE (1993); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, PATIENT ADVANCE DIRECTIVES: FACILITY
AND PATIENT RESPONSES (August 1993).
7. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 765.101-.401 (West 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West 1993).
8. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 667, 691-92 (Ariz. CL App. 1986); Satz v. Perl-
mutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220-21 (N.J. 1985);
In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1379 (Wash. 1984).
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end-of-life care. More importantly, whether or not they are aware of
patient preferences, physicians generally seem to make treatment de-
cisions that reflect their own preferences rather than the preferences
of their patients. This Article reviews the problems with end-of-life
statutes and suggests measures to deal with those problems.
I. TYPES OF END-OF-LIFE STATUTES
End-of-life statutes.break down into two categories, statutes that
provide for advance directives and statutes that provide for end-of-life
decisionmaking for patients who have not written an advance direc-
tive. Among the statutes that provide for advance directives are living-
will laws, durable power of attorney for health care laws, and do not
resuscitate order laws. Health care surrogate laws provide for deci-
sionmaking when the patient has not written an advance directive.
A. Living-Will Laws
Living wills are documents in which individuals indicate whether
they desire life-sustaining treatment during the final stages of life.
They are termed "living" wills because they take effect while the per-
son is still alive (but after the person has lost the ability to make medi-
cal decisions).' In their living wills, people can dictate which
treatments should be provided and under what circumstances they
should be provided.1 ° For example, a person may want a feeding
tube, but not a ventilator, if terminally ill or may want neither a feed-
ing tube nor ventilator if permanently unconscious. An alternative
name for a living will is a treatment directive.
Traditionally, living wills have included only general statements
about life-sustaining treatment (e.g., no life-sustaining treatment if an
irreversible and terminal illness develops)." More recently, legisla-
tures and scholars have developed detailed forms in which people can
provide clearer guidance. For example, in one approach, the form
contains several possible illness scenarios, and people can indicate
which of more than a dozen medical treatments they would want for
each scenario.1" Because the number of possible treatment decisions
far exceeds those contained in even the most detailed document, an-
other form asks people to provide detailed information about their
values so that, when treatment decisions arise, doctors or surrogates
9. David Orentlicher, Advance Medical Directives, 263 JAMA 2365, 2365 (1990).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(c) (1990); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.010(c) (1991).
12. Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New Comprehensive
Advance Care Documen4 261 JAMA 3288 (1989).
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can make appropriate decisions from application of the patient's val-
ues to the situation at hand. This approach is termed a "values his-
tory."'" In a third approach, the American Medical Association
recommends that patients describe their goals of treatment (e.g.,
treatment should be provided only if it restores the ability to commu-
nicate with others, or treatment should be provided as long as it can
maintain life). 4 Under this approach, when a treatment decision
arises, a physician would provide treatment only if it served the pa-
tient's stated goals.
Living-will statutes tend to be limited in scope, often applying
only to patients who are terminally ill or permanently unconscious
and often restricting the freedom to have artificial nutrition and hy-
dration discontinued. 15
B. Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Laws
Instead of giving directions about which treatments should or
should not be provided, people can dictate who should make medical
decisions on their behalf in the event that they become unable to
make medical decisions for themselves. In other words, an individual
can appoint a proxy or surrogate decisionmaker and give the surro-
gate authority to make any medical decision that the patient would be
entitled to make if the patient were mentally competent.' 6 In making
medical decisions for the patient, the surrogate attempts to deduce
the patient's preferences from the patient's previously expressed
wishes or goals of treatment and the patient's personal values.
Rather than choose between a living will or a proxy appointment,
people can also combine the two kinds of advance directive into a
single directive. 7 In such cases, a patient appoints a surrogate and
instructs the surrogate to follow the patient's instructions regarding
treatment.' 8 When instructions fail to give adequate guidance, surro-
gates have authority to make their best judgment about the patient's
preferences.' 9
13. Pam Lambert et al., The Values Histoy: An Innovation in Surrogate Medical Decision-
Making, 18 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 202 (1990).
14. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ADVANCE MEDICAL DiRECTrIVES FOR PATIENTS: A
GUIDE TO LIING WILLS AND POWERS OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE 9, 12-13 (1992).
15. Charles P. Sabatino, Death in the Legislature: Inventing Legal Tools for Autonomy, 19
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 309, 313, 330 (1991-92).
16. Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2366. The patient also can limit the surrogate's au-
thority to only certain kinds of decisions.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Most durable power of attorney statutes prescribe forms that al-
low for appointing a surrogate and for instructing the surrogate re-
garding treatment.20 Proxy laws are less likely than living-will laws to
limit their application to terminally ill or permanently unconscious
patients. They often apply to patients with any diagnosis. Similarly,
they are less likely to have restrictions on the kinds of treatment that
the surrogate can order withdrawn.21
C. Do Not Resuscitate Order Laws
A do not resuscitate (DNR) order allows a patient to request not
to receive cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) if the patient suffers a
cardiac arrest. In essence, a patient's request not to be resuscitated is
simply a living will requesting that the patient not receive one kind of
treatnent-CPR. CPR has probably been singled out for special con-
sideration because, if it is withheld, the patient will die inevitably-and
immediately.
Generally, states have enacted DNR order statutes for one of two
purposes. Some laws, as in New York,22 were enacted to cover DNR
orders for patients in health care facilities and are designed to ensure
that CPR is not withheld by mistake or without proper consent.23
Other laws apply to the emergency medical services setting and are
designed to make clear that paramedics can respect a patient's wishes
not to be resuscitated. Often these laws, as in Maryland, 24 are in-
cluded as a provision of a comprehensive advance directive statute.
D. Health Care Surrogate Laws
Despite considerable publicity about advance directives, most
people do not use them. Surveys find that only between four and sev-
enteen and a half percent of adult Americans have completed an ad-
vance directive. 25 Accordingly, many states have enacted statutes
20. See, e.g., CAL. CML CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-501
to -502 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (Michie 1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -
4509 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994).
21. See supra note 20.
22. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2960-2979 (McKinney Supp. 1993); see also GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-36-2 to -13 (Michie 1991).
23. See generally Russell S. Kamer et al., Effect of New York State's Do-Not-Resuscitate Legisla-
tion on In-Hospital Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Practice, 88 AM. J. MED. 108 (1990).
24. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-608 (1994); see also Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-
3251 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987.1 (Michie Supp. 1993).
25. La Puma et al., supra note 6, at 402. Not surprisingly, certain subgroups of the
population are more likely to complete advance directives. For example, patients with
HIV-related diseases use advance directives at a higher rate than does the general popula-
tion. Joan M. Teno et al., The Use of Formal Prior Directives Among Patients with H1V-Related
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giving authority to family members or close friends to make end-of-life
decisions for patients who have not completed advance directives.26
The surrogate laws list potential surrogates (e.g., guardian,
spouse, child, parent, sibling, or close friend) and prioritize them on
the basis of decisionmaking authority.27 Often, physicians or poten-
tial surrogates can invoke surrogate laws only when a patient has a
qualifying condition-typically a terminal illness, permanent uncon-
sciousness, or a condition in which the burdens of life markedly out-
weigh the benefits.218
II. PROBLEMS WITH END-OF-LIFE STATUTES
There are a number of problems with the different types of stat-
utes that facilitate end-of-life decisionmaking for patients who have
lost decisionmaking capacity.29
A. Misleading the Public About Its Rights
1. The Absence of a Statute.-When legislatures pass statutes that
recognize advance directives or surrogate decisionmaking, they create
the impression that there is no right to issue an advance directive, or
be represented by a surrogate, if an enabling statute has not been
passed. Otherwise, why bother with the statutes at all? Yet, the rights
granted in these statutes often simply duplicate common law or consti-
tutional rights. For example, in discussing durable powers of attorney
for health care in her concurrence in the Cruzan case, Justice
O'Connor observed that states "may well be constitutionally re-
quired" 0 to respect an incompetent patient's prior appointment of a
surrogate decisionmaker. Similarly, even under the most stringent ev-
Diseases, 5J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 490, 493 (1990). Seriously ill patients also appear to be
more likely to complete advance directives. Joanne Lynn & Joan M. Teno, After the Patient
Self-Determination Act: The Need for Empirical Research on Formal Advance Directives, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 20, 21.
26. RIGHT-TO-DIE LAw DIGEST, supra note 6, at "Surrogate Decisionmaking" chapter; see
alsoJerry A. Menikoff et al., Beyond Advance Directives-Health Care Surrogate Laws, 327 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1165, 1165-66 (1992) (describing the benefits of statutes that designate a
"backup" surrogate decisionmaker).
27. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 40/25 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (1994).
28. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 40/20 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606(b) (1994).
29. For an informative and recent discussion of the problems with advance directive
laws, see Ardath A. Hamann, Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement to Living Wills and
Durable Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REv. 103, 123-34 (1993).
30. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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identiary standards used in end-of-life cases-New York's31 and Mis-
souri' S -12 clear and convincing evidence standards-a patient's prior
written rejection of life-sustaining treatment would be adequate proof
of the patient's wishes to allow a physician to withdraw treatment."3
Indeed, in In re Westchester County Medical Center, a when discussing the
clear and convincing evidence standard, the New York Court of Ap-
peals stated that "[t]he ideal situation is one in which the patient's
wishes were expressed in some form of a writing, perhaps a 'living
will,' while he or she was still competent."35 Florida's Supreme Court
upheld the validity of a living will that a patient wrote nine years
before the enactment of Florida's living will statute.3 6  Arizona's
Supreme Court endorsed the concept of a durable power of attorney
for health care before the state had an authorizing statute. 7
Although court cases may ultimately vindicate common law or
constitutional rights and demonstrate that statutory authorization is
not necessary, many medical decisions will be made in the meantime
and may unfortunately be made on the incorrect assumption that life-
sustaining treatment cannot be withdrawn or withheld without statu-
tory authorization. The inappropriate dependence on statutory au-
thorization is especially prevalent among emergency system
personnel. Recently, emergency personnel have advocated for the en-
actment of statutes that specifically permit people to reject CPR when
they are outside of a hospital or nursing home.38 Without these spe-
cial DNR statutes, emergency personnel reason that they are obligated
to administer CPR in the event of a cardiac arrest outside of a hospital
or nursing home, even if the person has clearly requested that CPR
not be administered.39 This is so even though there is nothing about
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment that confines that right to
hospital or nursing home wards, and there is no reason why a person
31. In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613-15 (N.Y. 1988).
32. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 415 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
33. David Orentlicher, The Right to Die AJler Cruzan, 264JAMA 2444, 2445 (1990); Alan
Meisel, Legal Myths About Terminating Life Support 151 ARCHIVES INTERNA.L MED. 1497, 1501
(1991).
34. 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
35. Id. at 613.
36. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
37. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 667, 688 n.21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
38. Many states have enacted such statutes. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-18.6-101 to
15-18.6-108; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-39-1 to 31-39-9.
39. Kenneth V. Iserson & Carol Stocking, Standards and Limits: Emergency Physicians'
Attitude Toward Prehospital Resuscitation, 11 Am. J. EMERGENCY MED. 592, 593 (1993); Ken-
neth V. Iserson, Foregoing Prehospital Care: Should Ambulance Staff Always Resuscitate?, 17 J.
MED. ETHics 19, 23 (1991).
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should be required to have a different document for each place in
which life-sustaining treatment might be administered. 40
The assumption that the lack of a statute means that no rights
exist is particularly troublesome when advance documents have not
been written. Ordinarily, when the patient has not left an advance
directive, family members are relied upon to make decisions for the
patient. Indeed, physicians have historically turned to family mem-
bers for medical decisions when patients are mentally incompetent,
and courts generally have recognized the authority of families to make
life-sustaining treatment decisions for incompetent patients.41 How-
ever, since some states have adopted health care surrogate laws, physi-
cians in other states may wonder whether they can implement a family
member's decision in the absence of an enabling statute, particularly
since the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional basis for family
decisionmaking. 42 Because in the overwhelming majority of cases
there is no advance directive, uncertainty about family authority could
have a profound effect on end-of-life decisionmaking.
2. Statutory Limitations.-As a corollary to the assumption that
certain rights do not exist without an enabling statute, people also
may mistakenly assume that the statutes enunciate the full extent of a
patient's right and that any rights not enunciated do not exist. For
example, if a living-will statute applies specifically to terminally ill pa-
tients, as some do,43 people are likely to conclude mistakenly that the
right to use a living will does not extend to patients who, for example,
40. To be sure, patients may want CPR for some cardiac arrests but not others. For
example, a patient may not want to be resuscitated if her condition deteriorates and her
heart stops beating. Conversely, if she is undergoing surgery and her heart stops beating
because of a reversible anesthetic complication, she may want to be resuscitated. Conse-
quently, patients may need to specify in their advance directives whether they want a DNR
order to always apply or apply only in certain situations. See Cynthia B. Cohen & Peter J.
Cohen, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in the Operating Room, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1879, 1880-81
(1991) (proposing a policy of "required reconsideration" of DNR orders before surgery);
see also Robert M. Walker, DNR in the OR- Resuscitation as an Operative Risk, 266JAMA 2407,
2407 (1991) (arguing that intraoperative DNR orders should be permissible); Stuart J.
Youngner et al., DNR in the Operating Room: Not Really a Paradox, 266 JAMA 2433 (1991)
(discussing the medical and ethical implications of intraoperative DNR orders).
41. See Sabatino, supra note 15, at 319-20.
42. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990).
43. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(a) (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(a) (1983);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103(a) (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (Vernon Supp. 1992);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-04 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605, 127.610 (1990). Since
the Supreme Court decided the Cruzan case, many living will statutes that were limited to
only terminally ill patients now include permanently unconscious patients. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH -& SAFETY CODE § 7186(h) (West Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (a)
(1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101(17) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3 (1991).
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are permanently unconscious or have severe Alzheimer's disease, but
are not terminally ill. Similarly, if a health care surrogate law applies
only to patients who are terminally ill, permanently unconscious, or in
an end-stage condition, people are likely to question the authority of
surrogates to make decisions for patients who do not fall within these
categories. In fact, researchers have documented this line of thinking
in a survey in which Wisconsin physicians were asked about their atti-
tudes toward Wisconsin's living-will law.44 In the survey, only thirty-six
percent of the physicians believed that the law would be effective.45
Most physicians who doubted the law's efficacy explained their doubts
on the basis that the statute applied only to terminally ill patients and
defined a terminal condition very narrowly.46 This is so even though
case law clearly demonstrates that the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment applies to patients with nonterminal illnesses,47 the only is-
sue being whether the patients have expressed their wishes clearly
enough.4
There are several limitations of this nature in advance directive
statutes: limitations that are meaningless because either the common
law or constitution already protects the right at issue. Examples in-
clude provisions that exclude mature minors from their coverage49
and provisions that specifically state that advance directives that con-
form to another state's statute will not be honored.5" With regard to
44. Robyn S. Shapiro et al., Living Will in Wisconsin, 85 Wis. MED. J. 17, 20 (1986).
45. Id.
46. Id. The statute defined terminal condition as one in which the patient is likely to
die within 30 days. Id. Since the study was published, Wisconsin has amended its defini-
tion of terminal condition. It is now defined as a condition in which injury or illness causes
an incurable condition "that reasonable medical judgment finds would cause death immi-
nently, so that the application of life-sustaining procedures serves only to postpone the
moment of death." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(8) (1989).
47. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (denying
family's request to have a life-support system removed because the patient's wishes were
not clearly expressed); Deel v. Syracuse Veterans Admin. Med. Ctr., 729 F. Supp. 231
(N.D.N.Y. 1990) (upholding the right of a patient who had developed "graft-versus-host"
disease following bone marrow treatment to refuse life sustaining medical treatment); Gray
v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) (requiring hospital to comply with husband's
request to have a feeding tube and other life support removed from an unconscious pa-
tient when evidence established that to be the patient's wish).
48. Orentlicher, supra note 33, at 2444.
49. See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1990); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.010(c) (1991); Aiz. REv.
STAr. ANN. § 36-3261 (1993); see also Lisa Anne Hawkins, Living-Will Statutes: A Minor Over-
sight, 78 VA. L. REv. 1581 (1992) (exploring medical consent as a vehicle to inform legisla-
tive decisions concerning the capacity of minors to execute living wills). Maryland's statute
includes emancipated minors but not mature minors. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTil-GEN. §§ 5-
601(f), 20-102(a) (1994).
50. Oregon, in fact, expressly states that a living will "shall" be written according to the
statutory form. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.610 (1990).
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the first, the common law of many jurisdictions protects the right of
mature minors to make medical decisions. Mature minors likely
could rely on this right to issue valid medical advance directives. With
regard to the second, the constitution protects the right of people to
make treatment decisions if there is clear and convincing evidence of
the patient's wishes. An advance directive from another state un-
doubtedly would provide evidence sufficient to meet this standard.
End-of-life statutes regularly state that their provisions are cumu-
lative and include rights derived from other sources of law,51 but
laypeople often fail to appreciate the significance of these provisions.
In addition, courts often are influenced by the scope of end-of-life
statutes when deciding the scope of a person's common law or consti-
tutional rights.. For example, an Ohio court of appeals invoked the
state's durable power of attorney law in concluding that incompetent
patients do not have a common law or constitutional right to have a
feeding tube discontinued, even if the patients have clearly evidenced
their wishes not to be artificially fed.5 2
Another way that the language of an end-of-life statute may mis-
lead people about their rights is that people may assume that an ad-
vance directive is not valid if they do not use the statutory form. This
assumption may exist even in cases in which the statute specifically
states that the statutory form need not be used.53 People are naturally
skeptical of documents that do not have an "official" look to them; a
handwritten, or even typewritten, advance directive is less likely to be
implemented than a directive in which a patient has filled out the
statutory form, even if the handwritten or typewritten document satis-
fies all of the statutory requirements. The situation is similar to trying
to have a check accepted when the check is written on a plain piece of
paper rather than a standard bank check draft. Although the plain
paper check is legally valid,54 it will not be readily accepted.
In some cases, advance directive statutes have provisions that are
probably unconstitutional. A number of states expressly prohibit or
restrict the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration.55 After
the Cruzan decision, however, such restrictions are almost certainly
51. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-9(d) (1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191.5(h)
(West Supp. 1992); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 755 para. 35/9(d) (Smith-Hurd 1992); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-616(a) (1994).
52. Couture v. Couture, 549 N.E.2d 571, 574-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
53. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-104(3) (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755 para.
35/3(e) (Smith-Hurd 1992); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (1994).
54. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 3-104 (1992).
55. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-114 (Burns 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3)
(Verhon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(2) (1992); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
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unconstitutional.5" Treatment of pregnant women provides another
example of potentially unconstitutional provisions. Thirty-four living
will statutes expressly limit the freedom of incompetent patients to
have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn if they are pregnant,57 even
though courts generally hold that medical treatment cannot be im-
posed on a pregnant woman against her will to benefit her fetus.5"
Until such provisions are overturned by the courts, health care provid-
ers and institutions are likely to assume that they are valid when mak-
ing medical treatment decisions.
Liability concerns compound the tendency of physicians not to
recognize advance directives that deviate from the statutory provi-
sions. Although there is virtually no legal risk from discontinuing life-
sustaining treatment in accordance with a patient's or surrogate's
wishes,59 physicians often report that their fear of legal liability affects
their willingness to follow an advance directive's instructions to stop
life-sustaining treatment." Advance directive statutes respond to this
§ 1337.13(E) (Anderson 1993); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.605(3) (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-
2-1103(6)(b) (Supp. 1993).
56. Orentlicher, supra note 33, at 2444-45. Indeed, even though Indiana's living-will
statute restricts the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-
11-4 (Bums 1993), the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that there was a common law
right in Indiana to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32,
40-41 (Ind. 1991).
57. RIGHT-TO-DIE LAw DIGEST, supra note 6, at "Surrogate Decisionmaking" chapter.
58. In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1246 (D.C. 1990) (holding that, in deciding whether to
perform a cesarean section, "the state's interest in preserving life must be truly compelling
to justify overriding a competent person's right to refuse medical treatment"); Baby Boy
Doe v. Mother Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that "a woman's compe-
tent choice to refuse" a cesarean section "must be honored" even when her choice "may be
harmful to her fetus"). But seeJefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hous. Auth., 274 S.E.2d
457 (Ga. 1981) (upholding an order for a woman with placenta previa to undergo a
cesarean section involuntarily).
59. See Orentlicher, supra note 33, at 2446 ("No person has ever been found liable for
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment without court permission."); Robert F. Weir & Law-
rence Gostin, Decisions to Abate Life-Sustaining Treatment for Nonautonomous Patients, 264
JAMA 1846, 1852 (1990) ("Every court of final decision in every jurisdiction that has ad-
dressed the question of physician liability . . . has found physicians participating in the
cases to be free from civil or criminal sanctions.").
60. See Renee M. Goetzler & Mark A. Moskowitz, Changes in Physician Attitudes Toward
Limiting Care of Critically 11 Patients, 151 ARCHVES INTERNAL MED. 1537, 1538 (1991) (find-
ing that physicians were more concerned in 1988 than 1981 about malpractice liability
when deciding how aggressively to treat critically ill patients); Merrijoy Kelner et al., Ad-
vance Directives: The Views of Health Care Professionals, 148 CNDIAN MED. Ass'NJ. 1331, 1335
(1993) (expressing concerns that directives are not legal documents and thus offer no
legal safeguards); Joel M. Zinberg, Decisions for the Dying: An Empirical Study of Physicians'
Responses to Advance Directives, 13 VT. L. REv. 445, 479-81 (1989) (identifying physicians' fear
of potential lawsuits, prosecutions, and civil or criminal liability as the major impediment
to withdrawing life-sustaining treatment).
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concern by providing physicians with immunity from civil or criminal
liability if they carry out in good faith an advance directive completed
according to statutory requirements. 61 The statutory grant of immu-
nity would not exist, however, if the advance directive went beyond
statutory provisions and was based on common law or constitutional
provisions. Consequently, fear of legal liability may discourage physi-
cians from carrying out advance directives that exceed statutory
boundaries. Fears of legal liability seem to be a particular concern
among emergency system personnel. As a consequence, they are re-
luctant to honor do not resuscitate orders.62
The concern about restrictive statutory provisions may be less se-
rious with health care surrogate acts. For certain life-sustaining treat-
ment decisions, courts have given a narrow scope to surrogate
authority. In the Cruzan case, the Missouri Supreme Court would not
recognize a right of the family to discontinue a feeding tube from a
patient who was permanently unconscious, unless the family's deci-
sion was based on clear and convincing evidence that the patient
would not want the feeding tube.63 The United States Supreme Court
upheld the Missouri court's decision on that issue.' Since health care
surrogate acts typically allow surrogates to direct withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, including a feeding tube, from a permanently
unconscious patient, a health care surrogate act is more likely than an
advance directive statute to grant rights that are not already part of
the constitutional or common law landscape. In addition, when surro-
gate acts impose limitations on surrogate authority, they are similar to
the kinds of limitations that already exist in the common law and con-
stitutional law. For example, courts generally limit the authority of
surrogates to discontinue feeding tubes in patients who are neither
terminally ill nor permanently unconscious (e.g., seriously demented
patients).65 Similarly, surrogate acts tend to limit the authority of sur-
61. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-7 (1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190.5 (West
Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 35/7 (Smith-Hurd 1994); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 5-609(a) (1994).
62. See Iserson, supra note 39, at 23 (recognizing that emergency personnel are not
clearly included in statutory definitions of health care workers).
63. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424-26 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
64. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990).
65. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (NJ. 1985) (allowing a surrogate to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment only under certain circumstances and only if certain procedures are
followed); In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that a
surrogate was not allowed to withdraw treatment when patient's wish to do so was not
clear).
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rogates when the patient is not terminally ill or permanently
unconscious. 6
B. Ambiguous Provisions
Many of the terms used in end-of-life statutes are ambiguous. For
example, statutory provisions often apply specifically to terminally ill
patients. Yet, it is often unclear when a patient qualifies as terminally
ill. Under Illinois's living will statute, a living will would take effect
when the patient has a terminal condition,67 defined as "an incurable
and irreversible condition which is such that death is imminent and
the application of death delaying procedures serves only to prolong
the dying process." 8 The statute, however, does not define "immi-
nent" or give guidance for determining when a life-sustaining treat-
ment is delaying death rather than prolonging life. The Illinois law
also forbids withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration if the with-
drawal "would result in death solely from dehydration or starvation
rather than from the existing terminal condition."6" Yet, the very pur-
pose of discontinuing artificial nutrition and hydration is to allow the
patient to die from dehydration and starvation.
Similarly, health care surrogate acts often apply not only to termi-
nally ill or permanently unconscious patients, but also to those who
are in an "end-stage" 70 or overly burdensome 71 condition. While
these additional conditions admirably expand coverage to other pa-
tients who may no longer want treatment, the statutes do not ade-
quately explain when a patient comes within their scope.
C. Discerning Patients' Wishes
Some of the difficulty with end-of-life decisions probably reflects
physician uncertainty about patient wishes. A physician may try to
carry out the patient's preferences, but may not be certain what those
preferences are. Indeed, studies consistently have shown that, while
physicians often believe they know their patients' treatment prefer-
ences, they generally do not know those preferences.72 For example,
in one study, patients were given six hypothetical scenarios and asked
66. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 755, para. 40/20 (Smith-Hurd 1992); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606(b) (1994).
67. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 53/3(a) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
68. Id. para. 35/2(h).
69. Id. para. 35/2(d).
70. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606(b) (1994).
71. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 40/10 to /15 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
72. Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians'and Spouses'Predictions of Elderly Patients'Resus-
citation Preferences, 43J. GERONTOLOGY, MI15, Ml16 (1988).
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to indicate their treatment preferences.73 Their physicians were asked
to predict the patients' preferences. 4 In five out of six scenarios, the
physicians were no better than chance in their predictions.75 Yet, in
more than seventy-eight percent of cases, physicians believed their
predictions were accurate."6 In another study, patients were asked
their treatment preferences for several hypothetical scenarios, and the
patients' physicians were asked both to give their own preferences and
to predict their patients' preferences.77 The data from that study
showed that the physicians' predictions of the patients' preferences
more closely corresponded with their own preferences than with their
patients' preferences; indeed, the physicians' predictions corre-
sponded poorly with the patients' actual preferences.'8
These results are not surprising; extensive discussions between
physicians and patients about end-of-life care are not common.79 In-
deed, studies of DNR orders indicate that physicians do a poor job of
eliciting patient values and preferences.8 0 Typically, patients partici-
pate in their DNR decisions only twenty percent of the time."' It is
true that patients often lack decisionmaking capacity when the DNR
order is written. 2 This, however, is more a result of physician delay in
discussing CPR than an inevitable consequence of patient illness.
One study indicated that, while seventy-six percent of the patients
were mentally incapacitated when the DNR order was written, only
eleven percent of these patients had been incapacitated when they
entered the hospital."' Even when patients have decisionmaking ca-
pacity, they may be excluded from decisionmaking. In a study involv-
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at Ml17.
76. Id.
77. Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Do Physicians' Own Preferences for Life-Sustaining
Treatment Influence Their Perceptions of Patients' Preferences?, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 28, 29
(1993).
78. Id.
79. SeeJoy M. Roe et al., Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care: A Survey of Senior Center
Participants, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 292, 292 (1992).
80. Council on Ethical andJudicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Guidelines for
the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265 JAMA 1868, 1869 (1991) [hereinafter
Guidelines] (stating that while 93% of physicians surveyed believed that patients should be
involved in making decisions about CPR, only 10% of those physicians discussed resuscita-
tion preferences with their patients prior to cardiac arrest).
81. Id.
82. See id. (quoting a study finding that 76% of the patients studied were incapable of
indicating a treatment preference at the time the DNR order was written).
83. Susanne E. Bedell et al., Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders for Critically Ill Patients in the Hospi-
tal: How Are They Used and What Is Their Impact?, 256 JAMA 233, 235-36 (1986).
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ing fully competent patients, twenty percent of the do not resuscitate
decisions were made by family members only.84
Advance directive statutes will do little to make patient prefer-
ences clearer to physicians. First, a statute would only make a signifi-
cant difference if patients generally planned to write advance
directives, thereby making their preferences clearer to their physi-
cians, but refrained from doing so because they were waiting for a law
that recognized advance directives. The evidence suggests, however,
that advance directives are uncommon because patients are not in-
clined to use them, not because patients are being prevented from
using them. Although every state has at least one type of advance-
directive statute, surveys indicate that no more than fifteen percent of
Americans have formalized their preferences through advance direc-
tives;" 5 indeed, some studies suggest that only about five percent of
Americans have completed an advance directive.86
Even when aggressive efforts are made to persuade patients to
write advance directives, results usually are disappointing.8 7 In one
study, elderly persons were divided into three groups, with the groups
receiving varying levels of information about advance directives.88 In
addition, half of the persons in each group were invited to a meeting
at which they could receive counseling about advance directives and
free legal assistance to complete an advance directive. 8 ' The research-
84. Andrew L. Evans & Baruch A. Brody, The Do-Not-Resuscitate Order in Teaching Hospi-
tals, 253 JAMA 2236, 2237 (1985). Conceivably, the family members were able to convey
the patients' preferences to the physicians. However, studies demonstrate that family
members do a poor job of predicting the preferences of patients. See Uhlmann et al., supra
note 72, at M117, M119 ("[T]he results [of the study] suggest that the resuscitation prefer-
ences of elderly outpatients often are not understood . . . by . . . spouses of long
duration.").
85. SeeJeremy Sugarman et al., Factors Associated with Veterans' Decisions About Living
Wills, 152 ARCHES INTERNAL MED. 343, 343 (1992) ("Only 9% to 15% of Americans have
formulated their treatment preferences in a [living will].").
86. See Susan M. Rubin et al., Increasing the Completion of the Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 271 JAMA 209, 210 (1994) (stating that in their
study only 5.8% of the participants, prior to education and intervention, had completed an
advance medical directive).
87. See Dallas M. High, Advance Directives and the Elderly: A Study of Intervention Strategies
to Increase Use, 33 GERONTOLOGIST 342, 342 (1993) (concluding that studies attempting
educational interventions have only had modest success in increasing the use of advance
directives).
88. Id. at 343. The groups were given materials in three different formats: (1) the
minimum information (a cover letter, brief instructions, and copies of the state's advance
directive forms); (2) moderate information (minimal information plus two short informa-
tional flyers about advance directives); or (3) the maximum information (the minimal
information plus a ten page booklet about advance directives).
89. Id. Thus, the study ended up with six different groups.
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ers found that the additional efforts doubled the use of advance direc-
tives in the group that received moderate information and an
invitation to the meeting. However, researchers found no statistically
significant increases in the use of advance directives in patients in the
other five groups." In another study, which involved adult patients in
an internal medicine clinic, researchers divided patients into three
groups.9" Patients in the first group received neither written informa-
tion about living wills nor discussed living wills with their physician;
patients in the second and third groups were given a booklet about
living wills, were instructed to direct any questions about living wills to
their physicians and were encouraged to complete the state's living
will document and present the completed document to their physi-
cian.92 Over a four month period, whenever physicians saw patients in
the third group, the physicians initiated a discussion about living wills
and encouraged the patients to complete a living will.9 No such dis-
cussions were initiated with group one and group two patients. 4 Af-
ter the four month period, each group three patient was contacted by
phone or letter and invited for a free clinic visit "to discuss and/or
complete the living will with their physician."95 No such follow-up was
implemented for group one or two patients.96 Ultimately, none of the
patients in group one or two completed a living will, and only fifteen
percent of the patients in group three completed a living will.97
A study with less intensive efforts yielded even worse results.98 Re-
searchers found no effect on the patients' likelihood of completing a
living will after an intervention consisting of a twenty to thirty minute
interview during which physicians discussed living wills with their geri-
atric patients and then gave the patients a copy of the statutory living
will form and a card reminding them to discuss advance directives
with their physician at their next clinic visit.99 A similar study with
durable powers of attorney yielded better, but still insubstantial, re-
sults.100 In this study, researchers mailed patients a cover letter, an
90. Id. at 344.
91. Jan Hare & Carrie Nelson, Will Outpatients Complete Living Wills? A Comparison of
Two Interventions, 6J. GEN. INTE rNAL MED. 41, 41-42 (1991).
92. Id. at 42.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95., Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 44.
98. Greg A. Sachs et al., Empowerment of the Older Patient? A Randomized, Controlled Trial to
Increase Discussion and Use of Advance Directives, 40 J. AM. GERIATRIc Soc'v 269, 272 (1992).
99. Id.
100. See Rubin et al., supra note 86, at 210.
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educational pamphlet, and a durable power of attorney form; re-
searchers also provided telephone assistance and additional informa-
tion."' Four weeks later, the researchers mailed the patients follow-
up letters and second copies of the power of attorney form.10 2 The
results of the study indicated that only eighteen and a half percent of
the patients completed the forms.10
3
Perhaps the most promising results in convincing patients to fill
out advance directives came from a recent study involving durable
powers of attorney. In that study, approximately two-thirds of patients
who were encouraged to appoint a durable power attorney did so.1"4
The high rate of completion apparently reflected the fact that the
study was limited to patients who were assessed by their physicians as
having a life-threatening illness t0 5 and that the researchers expended
considerable effort in encouraging patients to complete the forms.'0 6
In short, while some approaches achieve higher completion rates
than other approaches, the overall impression from the empirical
literature is that, even with education and encouragement, patients
generally are not likely to complete advance directives and there is
therefore little reason to think that enacting advance-directive statutes
will prompt many otherwise not inclined people to complete advance
directives.
Why are patients reluctant to complete advance directives?
There is a natural, human reluctance to confront one's mortality, and
people may simply find that filling out an advance directive is too un-
settling. A similar phenomenon exists with organ donation. Even
though most people support organ donation in the abstract, t1 7 few
have actually filled out organ donor cards.'0 8 Reluctance to confront
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 211.
104. Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Effects of Offering Advance Directives on Medical
Treatments and Costs, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 599, 602 (1992).
105. Id. at 600. Life-threatening illness was defined to mean that the patient had no
better than a 50% chance of surviving for five more years. Id.
106. Interview with Lawrence J. Schneiderman, lead author of study (Jan. 1994).
107. See Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures
Market, 58 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1, 9 (1989) (discussing a Gallup poll which found that 75%
of American adults approve of the concept of organ donation, but only 17% have signed
organ donor cards); Dianne L. Manninen & Roger W. Evans, Public Attitudes and Behavior
Regarding Organ Donation, 253JAMA 3111, 3111 (1985) (finding that while nearly 94% of
the population has heard of organ transplantation, only 19% of these people carry organ
donor cards).
108. Thomas D. Overcast et al., Problems in the Identification of Potential Organ Donors: Mis-
conceptions and Fallacies Associated with Donor Cards, 251 JAMA 1559, 1560 (1984) ("[T]he
number of card-carrying donors is 2% to 3% of all donors at most.").
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issues about dying is generally cited as a basis for the paucity of organ-
donor volunteers.1 °9 Even health care professionals are unlikely to
complete advance directives. A survey of 500 nurses and 500 physi-
cians found that only twenty percent had completed advance direc-
tives.' ° People also may assume that an advance directive will not be
necessary in their individual cases. It is natural to believe that tragedy
will fall elsewhere. Moreover, while a number of cases have generated
substantial publicity, the vast majority of end-of-life decisions are
made with little difficulty or conflict. Many persons believe that they
can trust family and friends to make the decisions that they would
want made and that there therefore is little need for an advance
directive.11 '
People also may be reluctant to complete advance directives out
of fear that doing so will have an adverse effect on their treatment. A
common concern is that, once a patient fills out an advance directive
and requests some withholding of treatment, physicians will devote
less attention to that patient's care and may withhold more treatment
than desired." 2 Indeed, in some cases in which patients have decided
to forgo cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), physicians have inter-
preted the decision as one to forgo other life-sustaining treatments."'
Even if advance directive laws caused people to start writing living
wills, physicians are still unlikely to gain a clear understanding of their
patients' wishes. Unfortunately, the typical living will form uses vague
language that results in ambiguous guidance when specific treatment
decisions arise. For example, in a case involving a patient with HIV
disease, the patient, Tom Wirth, had written a living will directing that
all life-sustaining treatment be withheld or withdrawn if he developed
an illness such that there was "'no reasonable expectation of recover-
ing or regaining a meaningful quality of life.""' 4 When Mr. Wirth
109. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 107, at 9 ("Those who refused to be organ donors cited
the following reasons: (1) a fear that their death would be hastened by over-eager doctors;
(2) aesthetic or religious objections to being dismembered; and (3) an unwillingness to
think about their own mortality.").
110. Gene C. Anderson et al., Living Wills: Do Nurses and Physicians Have Them ?, 86 AM. J.
NuRs. 271, 271 (1986).
111. Joanne Lynn, Why IDon't Have A Living Will, 19 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 101, 103
(1991).
112. Panagiota V. Caralis et al., The Influence of Ethnicity and Race on Attitudes Toward
Advance Directives, Life-Prolonging Treatments, and Euthanasia, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHics 155, 157
(1993).
113. David A. Schwartz & Philip Reilly, The Choice Not To Be Resuscitated, 34J. AM. GERIAT-
RICS Soc'y 807, 810-11 (1986).
114. Evans v. Bellevue Hosp., No. 16536/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (quoting from Mr.
Wirth's living will), in RIGHT-To-DIE LAw DIGEST, supra note 6, at "Fact Sheets" chapter.
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became stuporous from a parasitic brain infection and his physicians
proposed antibiotic treatment for the infection,"' Mr. Wirth's surro-
gate concluded that Mr. Wirth should not receive the antibiotics be-
cause his HIV infection prevented him from having a meaningful
quality of life.'1 6 Mr. Wirth's physicians argued that Mr. Wirth should
receive treatment because antibiotics might be able to eradicate the
parasitic infection and return Mr. Wirth to his preinfection state." 7
In short, ambiguity surrounded the question of whether Mr. Wirth's
condition was irreversible because his HIV disease could not be re-
versed or was reversible since the parasitic infection was potentially
eradicable." 8
Researchers documented the vagueness inherent in traditional
living will forms in a study of patients who had completed advance
directives that combined a proxy appointment with a general state-
ment about treatment preferences. 1 9 After patients had completed
their advance directives, researchers presented them with several hy-
pothetical scenarios and asked about their treatment preferences for
each of the scenarios.1 20 The researchers found that the general in-
structions in the advance directive "were often inconsistent with, and
poor predictors of, specific [treatment] preferences.' 2 '
Alternative living will forms have been proposed to eliminate the
ambiguities inherent in traditional forms. For example, the "Medical
Directive" 22 living will form presents patients with a decision grid that
has hypothetical scenarios on one axis' 2 3 and a number of different
medical treatments on the other axis. 1 24 People using the form check
off which treatments they would desire under which conditions. 25
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. The Evans court ordered treatment. Id. After a month of treatment produced no
improvement, therapy was halted and Mr. Evans died approximately one week later. Id.
119. Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Relationship of General Advance Directive Instructions
to Specific Life-Sustaining Treatment Preferences in Patients With Serious Illness, 152 ARCHIVES
INrERNAL MED. 2114, 2115 (1992).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2114.
122. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 12, at 3288.
123. Id. at 3290. For example, one such hypothetical scenario places the patient "in an
irreversible coma or a persistent vegetative state but with no terminal illness." Id. at 3291.
124. Id. at 3290. These treatment categories, including use of a ventilator or feeding
tube, "encompass the typical range of diagnostic and therapeutic interventions for incom-
petent patients." Id. at 3291.
125. Id. at 3291. According to the authors, the additional specificity "should help reflect
the nuances of patient preferences." Id.
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While alternative forms may reduce uncertainty somewhat, 12 6 they still
may not adequately record patients' wishes. For example, the advance
directive form may only allow an individual suffering from dementia
to choose or reject antibiotics, even though the decision would likely
depend on the reasons for, and the effects of, the antibiotics. If a
physician prescribes antibiotics with minimal side effects to treat a
painful, nonfatal skin infection, the patient would probably choose to
accept the antibiotics. If, on the other hand, a physician prescribes
antibiotics with serious side effects to treat a severe infection that is
likely to be fatal, the patient may be much less likely to accept
them.127 Unfortunately, even these detailed "Medical Directive" living
will forms cannot provide the patient with this degree of choice.
Maryland's statute provides another response to the lack of writ-
ten advance directives by recognizing oral advance directives.12 1
While this step should help," 9 it still does nothing about the failure of
physicians to engage their patients in discussions about end-of-life
decisions. 1
30
D. Inadequate Compensation for Physicians
Advance directive statutes do not address another important rea-
son why physicians have little understanding of patients' wishes. Gain-
ing an understanding of a patient's treatment preferences takes a
good deal of discussion and time. There are many possible illnesses
that might develop and corresponding treatments that might be ap-
propriate, and patients need to appreciate the different possibilities.
They also need to appreciate the benefits that could and could not be
accomplished through treatment. In short, considerable discussion is
required to enable patients to make meaningful decisions, express
their preferences to physicians, and explain how their preferences
vary given different scenarios. Physicians are not inherently unwilling
to take the time needed for sufficient discussion. However, under cur-
rent policies, they do not receive any compensation for the time
spent. Health insurance policies consider such discussions either
nonreimbursable, or reimbursable at very low rates. Unless physicians
are compensated for their time discussing end-of-life decisions, they
126. William R. Mower & LarryJ. Baraff, Advance Directives: Effect of Type of Directive on
Physicians' Therapeutic Decisions, 153 ARCHVES INTERNAL MED. 375, 377-78 (1993).
127. Allan S. Brett, Limitations of Listing Specific Medical Interventions in Advance Directives,
266 JAMA 825, 826 (1991).
128. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(d) (1994).
129. Orentlicher, supra note 33, at 2445.
130. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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will continue to allocate their time to activities that generate higher
compensation.
E. Socioeconomic Differences
While advance directives may be of great value to people who un-
derstand how to use them and are comfortable with their use, there is
some evidence that socioeconomic factors affect the likelihood that
people will use advance directives.' 3 ' Data suggest that advance direc-
tives are less likely to be used by individuals who are not well edu-
cated 3 2 or who are financially deprived.' 3 3 Similarly, preliminary
data suggest that African-American and Hispanic individuals are less
likely than non-Hispanic whites to complete advance directives.' 34 A
study on patient-physician communication found that nonwhite pa-
tients are less likely than white patients to discuss their end-of-life
treatment preferences with their physicians. 35 This conclusion was
found to be true even after controlling for income and education and
even though there was no difference between the white and nonwhite
patients' desires to discuss their preferences. 36
While one can only speculate as to the reasons for these dispari-
ties, it is not surprising that a person's lack of income or education
affects her likelihood of using advance directives. Such individuals
may not have an adequate understanding of advance directives and
may have less familiarity, and therefore less comfort, with legal docu-
ments. In addition, they may have a greater distrust of health care
providers and a greater fear that signing an advance directive will re-
sult in withholding desired medical care. Ethnic differences are also
not surprising. Views about death and dying vary among different cul-
tures. Moreover, people who have experienced discrimination
throughout their lives may particularly distrust health care providers.
Indeed, in one study, African-American patients were most likely to
131. See High, supra note 87, at 346 (relating education, race, and income to familiarity
with advance directives).
132. Dallas M. High, Why Are Elderly Patients Not Using Advance Directives?, 5 J. AGING &
HEALTH 497, 505-07 (1993).
133. High, supra note 87, at 346.
134. Rubin et al., supra note 86, at 211-12; High, supra note 87, at 346. However, these
data were not controlled for differences in income or education. See also Caralis et al.,
supra note 112, at 156-57 (finding no statistically significant difference in the relative per-
centages of African-Americans, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic whites that have executed ad-
vance directives).
135. Jennifer S. Hass et al., Discussion of Preferences for Life-Sustaining Care by Persons with
AIDS: Predictors of Failure in Patient-Physician Communication, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1241, 1246 (1993).
136. Id.
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fear that completing an advance directive would adversely affect their
care.
13 7
F. Failure of Surrogates to Represent Patients' Wishes
Proxy appointments are frequently advocated as an alternative to
living wills because they avoid many of the problems associated with
living wills. For example, durable power of attorney statutes typically
have fewer limitations than do living will statutes."3 ' While living will
statutes often apply only when the patient is terminally ill or in a per-
sistent vegetative state, durable power of attorney statutes usually ap-
ply whenever the patient lacks decisionmaking capacity." 9 Durable
power of attorney statutes also address the problem of vagueness with
directions for treatment in living wills. With a proxy appointment, a
patient can grant a surrogate authority to resolve any ambiguities in
the patient's expressed preferences. 4 '
Health care surrogate acts are also an important advance in end-
of-life decisionmaking. If an incompetent patient has not left an ad-
vance directive, a surrogate act increases the likelihood that physicians
will feel comfortable relying on the patient's family members to make
life-sustaining treatment decisions. In addition, health care surrogate
acts often have fewer limitations than advance directive statutes. For
example, in Illinois, the living-will act applies only to terminally ill pa-
tients' while the surrogate act applies to patients who are terminally
ill, permanently unconscious, or in an "incurable or irreversible con-
dition."142 As a result, unlike other advance directive statutes, which
may mislead patients and physicians by implying that certain common
law and constitutional rights do not exist, health care surrogate acts
are more likely to enumerate rights that were not clearly present
under existing case law.' 43
137. Caralis et al., supra note 112, at 157.
138. See Orentlicher, supra note 9, at 2366 ("A method of appointing a proxy with more
flexible authority is the creation of a 'durable power of attorney'. ..
139. Id.
140. Cf id. ("In contrast, there is no one with legal authority other than a judge, to
interpret the terms of a living will. .. ").
141. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 35/2(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
142. Id. para. 40/10.
143. Yet, these acts are not perfect. They fail to address many important issues. For
example, many elderly patients do not have family or friends to serve as surrogate deci-
sionmakers. Although health care surrogate acts recognize the authority of legal guardians
to make life-sustaining treatment decisions, guardianship appointments are generally not
carried out because they are costly and time-consuming. See Alison P. Barnes, Beyond
Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a System of Pincipled Deci-
sion-Making in Long Tenn Care, 41 EMORY L.J. 633, 680 (1992) ("[T]he cost of the creation of
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Despite its benefits, proxy decisionmaking has serious limitations,
the most significant being that it simply is unlikely to serve its basic
purpose. Surrogate decisionmaking is premised on the belief that sur-
rogates will make medical decisions that reflect patients' preferences.
The empirical data indicate, however, that surrogates do a poor job of
carrying out patients' wishes.14 4 Several studies have examined the
accuracy of surrogate decisionmakers by presenting individuals with
hypothetical scenarios and asking them to indicate their treatment
preferences for each scenario.145 Potential surrogates are simultane-
ously asked to predict the preferences of the individuals. 146 These
studies consistently demonstrate that the potential surrogates' predic-
tions do not reach a statistically significant degree of agreement with
the choices of the individuals. 147 This holds true even when individu-
als chose people that they would feel most comfortable with as surro-
gate decisionmakers. 148
These results are not surprising. There are several reasons why
agreement regarding end-of-life decisions between individuals and
their surrogates is poor. First, most people do not engage in meaning-
ful discussions of their treatment preferences with close family mem-
bers or friends.1 49 Consequently, the potential surrogates are not
likely to have a good sense of the person's preferences. Second, po-
tential surrogates tend to underestimate the quality of life of the peo-
ple for whom they will be making medical decisions. For example,
studies confirm that family members consistently underestimate the
a limited guardianship is $4000 to $6000 for elderly people with modest, typical assets. The
time from petition to adjudication ... is seldom less than two months."). Moreover, it is
not clear that guardians serve the patient's interests as much as the interests of others, such
as physicians frustrated by an inability to stop treatment that they consider inappropriate.
Surrogate acts also do not always reflect the changing nature of the family. Some acts
recognize close friends in their hierarchy of potential surrogates, see, e.g., ARmz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 36-3231 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401 (West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
755, para. 40/25(a) (7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-
605(a)(2)(vi) (1994); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2965.4(a) (McKinney Supp. 1993). Others
do not. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210 (Supp. 1993).
144. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Proxy Decision Making for Incompetent
Patients: An Ethical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 267JAMA 2067, 2069 (1992) (citing several such
studies); Jeremiah Suhl et al., Myth of Substituted Judgment: Surrogate Decision Making Regard-
ing Life Support is Unreliable, 154 ARcHIVEs INTERNAL MED. 90 (1994).
145. Id. at 2069-70.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 2069 ("[T]he empirical studies ... do suggest that proxies are not much
better than chance at predicting patients' preference during incompetence."):
148. Jan Hare et al., Agreement Between Patients and Their Self-Selected Surrogates on Difficult
Medical Decisions, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1049, 1052 (1992).
149. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 144, at 2068-69.
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quality of life of elderly persons.15 ° Because they underestimate qual-
ity of life, they may conclude that treatment is not desired even when
it is.' Physicians also consistently underestimate the quality of life of
elderly patients. 152 Thus, they are likely to recommend less aggressive
care to surrogates than the patient would desire.
Third, surrogates may be reluctant to authorize the withholding
of life-sustaining treatment for a family member and thus mistakenly
predict a person's treatment preferences. The psychological stress of
feeling responsible for another person's death, particularly a loved
one, may give surrogates pause when considering whether to discon-
tinue treatment.1 53 Indeed, although there is poor agreement be-
tween individuals and their surrogates, there seems to be a tendency
for surrogates to overpredict the degree of care desired by family
members.1 54
Thus, some factors drive surrogates toward deciding on less treat-
ment than that which is desired by patients, while others drive them
toward deciding on more than is desired. These opposing factors pos-
sibly could cancel each other out, causing surrogates to choose
roughly the appropriate amount of care. Conversely, they could serve
to increase the chances of a mismatch, causing some patients to re-
ceive excessive care and others to receive inadequate care. The em-
pirical data indicate that the latter is true: opposing tendencies
generally do not cancel each other out. As mentioned previously,
studies consistently find that surrogates are poor predictors of their
family members' preferences. 155
This is not to say that we should automatically reject proxy deci-
sionmaking. Although surrogates do a poor job of carrying out pa-
tient wishes, they may still be best situated to make decisions. Public
surveys indicate that patients prefer to have family members, rather
than physicians, judges, or others make their medical treatment deci-
150. Id. at 2069.
151. SeeJoseph G. Ouslander et al., Health Care Decisions Among Elderly Long-Term Care
Residents and Their Potential Proxies, 149 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1367, 1371 (1989) ("[A]
relatively high proportion of elderly people desire intensive intervention to prolong their
lives .. ").
152. Richard F. Uhlmann & Robert A. Pearlman, Perceived Quality of Life and Preferences
for Lfe-Sustaining Treatment in Older Adults, 151 ARcHrvEs INTERNAL MED. 495 (1991); Robert
A. Pearlman & Richard F. Uhlmann, Quality of Life in Chronic Disease: Perceptions of Elderly
Patients, 43 J. GERONrOLOGY M25, M27 (1988).
153. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 144, at 2068.
154. Uhlmann et al., supra note 72, at M117.
155. See supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text.
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sions for them.156 The choice of a surrogate decisionmaker is just as
much an exercise of autonomy as the giving of a specific treatment
instruction. As long as people understand that their surrogates may
not choose exactly as they would have, the exercise in autonomy is a
meaningful one. The important point is that the patient has decided
how the decision will be made. Moreover, many patients seem to pre-
fer that their surrogates choose in accordance with the surrogate's
view of the patient's best interests, rather than the surrogate's view of
the patient's preferences. 5
7
Although surrogate decisionmaking may be the best possible ap-
proach when patients have lost decisionmaking capacity, we must rec-
ognize that it is not a very effective method for carrying out patient
preferences. 158
III. PREDOMINANCE OF PHYSICIANS' VALUES IN END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS
In the previous sections, this Article suggested that end-of-life
statutes have limited impact because they are misleading or poorly
drafted, because patients do not document their preferences and phy-
sicians do not elicit patient preferences, and because surrogates do
not faithfully represent the wishes of patients. One could respond
156. See Dallas M. High, A New Myth About Families of Older People?, 31 GERONTOLOGIST
611, 615-16 (1991) (citing a survey that found that 94% of those who responded preferred
to have family members as surrogates); Dallas M. High, Standards for Surrogate Decision Mak-
ing: What the Elderly Wan4 17J. LONG-TERM CARE ADMIN. 8, 9 (1989) (citing an in-depth
survey of 40 patients in which 90% preferred to have family members serve as surrogate
decision-makers) [hereinafter High, Standards].
157. See High, Standards, supra note 156, at 9-10 (finding that 50% of those surveyed
favored the "best interest standard" over the "substituted judgment standard."). Some
commentators have observed that the family has its own interests that should not be ig-
nored when treatment decisions are made; Ashwini Sehgal et al., How Strictly Do Dialysis
Patients Want Their Advance Directives Followed?, 267 JAMA 59, 61 (1992) (finding that 31%
of those surveyed were willing to give "complete leeway" to their surrogate to override their
advance directive, and another 30% were willing to give at least "a little leeway" to their
surrogate). See, e.g., John Hardwig, What About the Family ? HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-
Apr. 1990, at 5 (arguing that the moral relevance of the interests of the family should be
acknowledged).
158. Surrogate decisionmaking has also been criticized because of the conflicts of inter-
est that family members have. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 286 (1990) ("[C lose family members may have a strong feeling... that they do not
wish to witness the continuation of the life of a loved one which they regard as hopeless,
meaningless, and even degrading.") (emphasis added). However, those cases probably
represent a minority of situations and can best be dealt with by implementing protective
safeguards. Former ChiefJustice Burger has stated: "[ t] hat some [family members] 'may at
times be acting against the interests of [the patient]'. . . creates a basis for caution, but is
hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that
[family members] generally do act in the [patient's] best interests." Parham v. JR., 442 U.S.
584, 602-03 (1979).
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that this simply reflects the need to learn from our experiences with
early statutes and early end-of-life decisionmaking and build on that
experience to improve the quality of end-of-life decisionmaking.
However, an even more fundamental concern about the efficacy of
end-of-life statutes calls into question whether even the best statutes or
the most intensive educational efforts will serve the goal of ensuring
that life-sustaining treatment decisions are based on the preferences
of patients. The potential success of end-of-life laws is inherently lim-
ited by fundamental philosophical disagreements about the way end-
of-life decisions should be made. In particular, considerable evidence
suggests a major gap between the generally accepted theory that end-
of-life decisions should be based on patient self-determination and the
actual practice of physicians in administering end-of-life care.1 59 The
evidence suggests that physicians generally still consider it their re-
sponsibility to make treatment decisions that they believe are in the
patient's best interest and that patient preferences should be ignored
if they are inconsistent with the physician's view of the patient's best
interests.16 In other words, it appears that end-of-life decisions are
frequently driven by the physician's values rather than the patient's
values.
A. Evidence of the Predominance of Physicians' Values
A number of important studies demonstrate the predominance
of physician values in end-of-life decisions. In the first study, nursing
home patients or, if the patients lacked decisionmaking capacity, their
surrogates, completed living wills.' 6 ' Over the next two years, when a
patient either died in the nursing home or was hospitalized, research-
ers examined the patient's medical records to determine whether the
medical decisions made for the patient were consistent with that pa-
tient's living will.' 62 The researchers found that seventy-five percent
of the decisions were consistent with the patient's advance
directive. 63
At first glance, the seventy-five, percent level of agreement seems
impressive and suggests a general respect for patients' values. A closer
examination indicates that physicians probably overrode patient pref-
159. Much of the following discussion is an elaboration of a thesis developed in David
Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101 (1992).
160. Kelner et al., supra note 60, at 1335-36.
161. Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for Life-Sustaining Care,
324 NEW ENG.J. MED. 882 (1991). Participants consisted of 126 mentally competent nurs-
ing home residents and 49 family members of incompetent residents. Id.
162. Id; at 882-83.
163. Id. at 884.
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erences a majority of the time when there was a disagreement between
the patient and physician. For most end-of-life decisions, people gen-
erally agree on the appropriate treatment. For instance, in a survey of
public preferences, eighty percent of those surveyed stated that they
would not want a ventilator or feeding tube if they were permanently
unconscious and over eighty percent stated that they would not want a
ventilator or feeding tube if they became demented and terminally
ill."' Accordingly, in most end-of-life situations, physicians and pa-
tients probably agree on whether treatment should be provided, and
much of the seventy-five percent consistency between the living wills
and the physicians' decisions can be explained by a sharing of values
between patients and physicians. When there is disagreement be-
tween physicians and patients, however, it follows that the physicians'
preferences generally prevail. 65 Assuming that there is a sixty per-
cent agreement rate and a forty percent disagreement rate between
patients and physicians, then a twenty-five percent override rate
means that physicians prevail in 62.5 percent of the disagreements
(twenty-five percent/forty percent).166
Other findings in the study also indicate that physicians were
more likely to base treatment decisions on their own values rather
than the patient's values. For example, in many cases, when the pa-
tient was transferred from the nursing home to a hospital, the pa-
tient's living will did not accompany the patient and was therefore not
incorporated into the patient's hospital chart.16 7 Yet, the living will's
presence in the patient's chart did not increase the likelihood that
physicians would follow the living will.16 Similarly, when patients who
had written their own living wills were compared with patients whose
living wills were written for them by their surrogates, there was no
164. Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care-A Case for Greater Use,
324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 889, 893 (1991).
165. See, e.g., Panagiota V. Caralis & Jeffrey S. Hammond, Attitudes of Medical Students,
Housestaff, and Faculty Physicians Toward Euthanasia and Termination of Life-Sustaining Treat-
ment, 20 CtRrMCAL CARE MED. 683, 686 (1992) (explaining that study results show that
31.3% of a combined group of caregivers found the patient's right to choose only a moder-
ately important or unimportant factor in end-of-life treatment decisions).
166. In a survey of family physicians in Ontario, Canada, only 44% of the physicians
reported that they always followed their patients' advance directives. David L. Hughes &
Peter A. Singer, Family Physicians' Attitudes Toward Advance Directives, 146 CANADIAN MED.
ASS'N J. 1937,.1941 (1992).
167. Danis et al., supra note 161, at 884. The hospital received the advance directive and
incorporated it into the patient's chart in only 25 of 71 hospitalizations. Id.
168. Id. at 885-86.
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difference in the likelihood that physicians would follow the living
will.1
69
Another study on advance directives corroborates these results.
As part of this second study, researchers randomly assigned patients to
either an experimental group that completed a durable power of at-
torney or to a control group that did not. 7 ° The researchers tracked
the patients for at least two years and compared the care of the pa-
tients in the advance directive group with that of the patients in the
control group.1 7' The researchers found no statistically significant
differences in the medical treatment that the patients in the two
groups received.172 While the lack of any difference in treatment
might suggest that advance directives fail to give meaningful gui-
dance, it also suggests that physicians base end-of-life treatment deci-
sions primarily on their own values.
In the first advance directive study,17 3 the researchers tried to dis-
cover why living wills were sometimes disregarded. After reviewing
the medical records and interviewing the physicians, the researchers
concluded that physicians often overrode living wills when they dis-
agreed with the wisdom of the patients' choices.' 74 In some cases, the
physicians provided undesired treatment because they felt that the
treatment was appropriate. 75 In other cases, they withheld desired
treatment because they believed that the treatment would not benefit
the patient."76 In short, physicians often overrode patient choice
when they believed that respecting patient preferences would not be
in the patient's best interests. 77 If physicians continue to believe that
they are obligated to make end-of-life medical decisions based on
their sense of the patient's best interests rather than on their under-
standing of the patient's wishes, living wills will have little effect on
medical decisionmaking. They will be respected only when they are
consistent with the physician's views of the patient's best interests.
Another study similarly demonstrates physicians unwillingness to
comply with patient choices that are inconsistent with their views of
169. Id.
170. Schneiderman et al., supra note 104, at 599-600.
171. Id. at 600-01.
172. Id. at 603.
173. See supra notes 161-169 and accompanying text.
174. Danis et al., supra note 161, at 886-87.
175. Id. at 886.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 887. The researchers concluded that "the data suggests that in caring for
incapacitated patients, physicians balance respect for autonomy with other competing ethi-
cal principles in order to make what they believe are the wisest decisions." Id.
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the patient's best interests.178 This third study relied on hypothetical
scenarios, asking physicians whether they would comply with a
number of potential patient decisions regarding end-of-life care, such
as withholding life-sustaining treatment or performing euthanasia.179
The scenarios involved four patients of varying ages and varying medi-
cal problems." ° When the researchers asked the physicians whether
they would comply with the patient's request to have a ventilator with-
drawn, the physicians' likelihood of compliance depended upon the
prognosis of the patient."' Over half of the physicians would with-
draw a ventilator upon request from a patient with widely metastatic
breast cancer or a patient bedridden from severe emphysema. 1 2
Conversely, less than a third of the physicians would withdraw a venti-
lator upon request from a mildly demented, though competent, eld-
erly woman with pneumonia."8 ' This difference likely reflects the fact
that, unlike the other two patients, the elderly woman had a reversible
respiratory problem and an expected survival of several more years."8
An important question is whether the physicians in these studies
acceded to patient choice only when the patient chose what the physi-
cian considered to be the best decision or whether the physicians were
willing to accept a patient's decision as long as it was within a reason-
able range of treatment options. The latter alternative cannot explain
the results of these studies. In end-of-life situations, the alternatives of
both treatment and no treatment are almost always within the reason-
able range of choices for patients to make. 8 5
178. Caralis & Hammond, supra note 165, at 683.
179. Id.
180. The patients included a 29-year-old male with AIDS, a 62-year-old male who was
bedridden with severe emphysema, a 78-year-old female with mild dementia (but still men-
tally competent) and acute pneumonia, and a 37-year-old female with widely metastatic
breast cancer. Id.
181. Id. at 687-88.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 686-87 (Table 5). In another study that presented physicians from seven
countries, including the United States, with hypothetical scenarios, over 40% of the physi-
cians' decisions differed from the care that had been requested by the hypothetical pa-
tient. Efrem Alemayehu et al., Variability in Physicians'Decisions on Caring for Chronically Ill
Elderly Patients: An International Study, 144 CANADLAN MED. Ass'N J. 1133, 1138 (1991).
184. Caralis & Hammond, supra note 165, at 684. Commentators have been quick to
point out that sometimes when physicians base their treatment decisions on the perceived
benefit of the treatment to the patient, they err about the actual likelihood of benefit.
Donna L. Miller et al., Factors Influencing Physicians in Recommending In-Hospital Cardiopulmo-
nary Resuscitation, 153 ARcHrvEs INmRNM. MED. 1999, 2002 (1993). The data reveal a ten-
dency to overestimate the likelihood of patient survival after in-hospital cardiopulmonary
resuscitation. Id.
185. As discussed below, there may be situations in which a medical treatment desired
by the patient would be futile and therefore not a reasonable choice. However, truly futile
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Another important study examining physician respect for patient
values focused on treatment decisions for patients in intensive care
units (ICUs).186 In this study, researchers considered all patients
treated in one of two intensive care units over a twelve-month period
and found that seven percent had had life-sustaining treatment with-
held or withdrawn. 87 The researchers then examined how the deci-
sions to withhold or withdraw treatment came about.1 8 The issue of
withholding or withdrawing care usually arose during the physicians'
work rounds when they were discussing their patients' treatment
plans.'8 9 Indeed, only six percent of the decisions to withhold or with-
draw treatment resulted from patient or surrogate requests. 190 More-
over, patients or their surrogates ultimately rejected the physician's
recommendation to withhold or withdraw care in only two percent of
cases. 191 In short, physicians almost always decided whether to con-
sider stopping treatment, and the ultimate decisions were almost al-
ways in accordance with the physicians' views.' 92
Researchers reached similar results in an earlier study limited to
do not resuscitate orders.' 93 In ninety percent of cases, the physician
raised the question of a DNR order.1'9 In addition, the decision to
issue the DNR order occurred within twenty-four hours of being
raised in more than sixty percent of cases.' 95 Because the patient or
her surrogate rarely raised the question of a DNR order and the final
decision to issue a DNR order occurred soon after the discussion be-
treatments represent only a very small percentage of treatments desired by patients at the
end of life. See infta notes 221-224 and accompanying text.
186. Nicholas G. Smedira et al., Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support from the Criti-
cally 114 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 309 (1990).
187. Id. at 310.
188. The researchers gathered data through observation of patients and through com-
pletion of standardized, closed-format questionnaires by critical care fellows, research
nurses, and family counselors. Id. at 309-10.
189. Id. at 311.
190. Id. at 312.
191. Id. Nine percent of the families, or 10 of the 106 studied, initially disagreed with
the physicians' suggestions to cease artificial life support, but eight of those families even-
tually capitulated. Id.
192. In the study, only 4% of the patients who had treatment withheld or withdrawn had
decisionmaking capacity at the time the decisions were made, Id. at 311. Thus, the physi-
cians' dominant role in the decisionmaking process possibly reflected the patients' inabil-
ity to participate in the process, rather than the physicians' dominance over the process.
However, it is likely that physician dominance explains the study results. If physician domi-
nance was not strong, the study should have documented a greater role for the family
members in the decisionmaking. They, after all, were the patients' surrogates.
193. Schwartz & Reilly, supra note 113, at 807.
194. Id. at 809.
195. Id.
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gan, there is good reason to believe that the physicians' values drove
the decisions. If the values of the patients were driving the decisions,
researchers would likely have found patients and their surrogates rais-
ing the issue of a DNR order more frequently; in addition, it is likely
that patients and surrogates would have taken more time to reach a
decision once the issue was raised by the physician.
Another important study looked at the issuance of DNR orders
for patients with one of four serious diagnoses-AIDS, metastatic lung
cancer, advanced liver cirrhosis, or severe congestive heart failure. 196
Researchers selected these four diagnoses because all had roughly the
same likelihood of death both in the short term (after one year) and
the long term (after five years). 197 Despite the similarities in progno-
sis, there were marked differences in likelihood of DNR orders. Ap-
proximately fifty percent of the AIDS and lung cancer patients had
DNR orders; only five to fifteen percent of the cirrhosis and heart
failure patients had DNR orders.198 The researchers examined the
hospital charts to see whether the differences could be explained by
differences among the patients in terms of their mental status or on
the basis that the patients' severity of illness varied from that pre-
dicted by their diagnostic category.' 99 Neither of these possibilities
explained the disparities.2 00
Moreover, differences among the patients in terms of their pref-
erences also could not explain the disparities. If patient preferences
were responsible for the differences, one would expect to see either
that patients with AIDS and lung cancer were more likely to request a
DNR order or that patients with cirrhosis and heart failure were less
likely to agree to a physician's suggestion of a DNR order. However,
as discussed earlier, two studies have shown that decisions to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining care are almost always initiated by physi-
cians. 20 1 Consequently, it is unlikely that the patients varied in their
tendency to request a DNR order. It is also unlikely that the patients
varied in their likelihood of agreeing to a DNR order. Among the
cirrhosis and heart failure patients who did not have a DNR order, the
records of fewer than five percent documented any discussion about
196. Robert M. Wachter et al., Decisions About Resuscitation: Inequities Among Patients with
Different Diagnoses but Similar Prognoses, 111 AuALs INTEINAL MED. 525, 525 (1989).
197. Id. at 526.
198. Id. at 528.
199. Id. at 529.
200. Id.
201. Schwartz & Reilly, supra note 113, at 809 (finding that the physician initiated the
DNR discussion in 90% of all cases); Smedira, supra note 186, at 311 (finding that the
decision usually originated with primary and intensive care teams on work rounds).
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CPR. 2  Therefore, it appears that the physicians approached the
question of CPR differently with AIDS and cancer patients than with
cirrhosis and heart failure patients.
The results of these studies are not at all surprising. The domi-
nance of physician values in medical treatment decisions is not unique
to end-of-life decisions. Studies of other treatment decisions show
similar results. For example, in a study of treatment for lung cancer,
the choice of surgery versus radiation was influenced more by physi-
cian risk preferences than by patient risk preferences. ° s Surgery has
a higher short-term risk of death but a lower long-term risk of
death.2 4 The patients were more risk averse than the physicians, but
the treatment choices between surgery and radiation were more con-
sistent with the risk preferences of the physicians.205 Additionally, in a
study of cesarean section rates among physicians at a single hospital,
the different obstetricians varied in their use of cesarean sections by a
factor of more than two.206 Medical or socioeconomic differences
among the patients could not account for the disparities; instead, the
disparities appeared to reflect idiosyncratic differences among the
physicians.20 7 Likewise, studies of racial and gender disparities in
clinical decisionmaking have found differences in treatment of coro-
nary artery disease and chronic kidney failure according to race and
gender that cannot be explained by variations in age, severity of dis-
ease, income, or type of insurance. 20 After controlling for these po-
tentially confounding variables, blacks are only fifty-five percent as
likely as whites to receive a kidney transplant,2 9 and women with
202. Wachter et al., supra note 196, at 530.
203. Barbaraj. McNeil et al., Fallacy of the Five-Year Survival in Lung Cancer, 299 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1397, 1401 (1978).
204. Id. at 1397.
205. Id. at 1401 ("Clearly ... most patients today are treated with operation because of
the overwhelming belief of most physicians that operation is 'better.'").
206. The frequency of cesarean sections varied from a low of 19.1% to a high of 42.37%.
Gregory L. Goyert et al., The Physician Factor in Cesarean Birth Rates, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED.
706, 707 (1989).
207. Id. at 708 ("The implication of our findings is that individual variation among phy-
sicians could be an important factor underlying the increasing cesarean-section rates.").
208. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Black-White
Disparities in Health Care 263 JAMA 2344 (1990); Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
American Medical Association, Gender Disparities in Clinical Decision Making, 266 JAMA 559
(1991).
209. PJ. Held et al., Access to Kidney Transplantation: Has the United States Eliminated In-
come and Racial Differences, 148 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2594 (1988); SCHOOL OF PUBUC
HEALTH, STATE UNIV. OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY &e NEw YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, END
STAGE RENAL DISEASE IN NEw YORK STATE 183, 209 (1991).
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symptoms of coronary artery disease are much less likely than men to
be evaluated for heart disease. °
Use of a surrogate would not address the problem of physicians
making decisions on the basis of their own values rather than the pa-
tients' values. 11 In the studies that demonstrated a predominance of
physician values, many of the patients were represented by their surro-
gates. Indeed, in the first advance directive study discussed, physi-
cians overrode advance directives written by surrogates to the same
extent that they overrode directives written by patients.212
B. Reasons for the Predominance of Physicians' Values
There are several possible explanations for the predominance of
physician values in end-of-life decisionmaking, including the natural
lag between theoretical acceptance and functional implementation of
a change, the fear of malpractice, the futility of implementing pa-
tients' choices, patients' reluctance to make decisions, patients' lack
of authority, and physicians' desire to preserve professional authority.
1. Natural Lag Between Theory and Practice.-With any theoretical
development, there is a natural lag between theoretical acceptance
and the practical implementation of the change. Physicians, like
others, do not change established practices immediately, and it makes
sense to subject new theories to the test of time to ensure their
validity.
Nevertheless, this is not a sufficient explanation for the failure of
physicians to respect patient values. Most of the studies discussed in
this Article were conducted at major teaching hospitals where interns
and residents are responsible for much of the decisionmaking.2 1 3 Ac-
cordingly, physicians who were still in the midst of their postgraduate
training and within a few years of graduation from medical school
made most of the treatment decisions. These physicians received all
of their medical training after principles of patient self-determination
had received widespread recognition. In addition, ample evidence in-
dicates that physicians are perfectly capable of making rapid changes
in their modes of practice when they so desire. For example, within
five years of its introduction into the United States, laparoscopic cho-
210. J.N. Tobin et al., Sex Bias in Considering Coronary Bypass Surgery, 107 ANNALs INTER-
NAL MED. 19 (1987).
211. See infra notes 250-251 and accompanying text.
212. See supra text accompanying note 169.
213. See, e.g., Smedira et al., supra note 186, at 309 (conducting a study at the Moffit-
Long Hospital of the University of California and San Francisco General Hospital).
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lecystectomy replaced more traditional methods of surgery in approxi-
mately eighty percent of operations to remove the gall bladder.214
This rapid adoption of the newer method is particularly striking given
the absence of any rigorous studies comparing the two methods2 15
and the fact that laparoscopic surgery requires very different tech-
niques than the traditional method of gall bladder surgery.
216
2. Fear of Malpractice. -Physicians often cite concerns about lia-
bility risk as a deterrent to practicing good medicine. These physi-
cians may fear retaliatory suits from family members if life-sustaining
treatment is withdrawn or withheld from a patient. Indeed, this fear
of liability, though unfounded,1 7 appears to influence physician will-
ingness to discontinue life-sustaining treatment.218 This alone, how-
ever, does not adequately explain the predominance of physician
preferences in end-of-life treatment decisions. Often, when physicians
impose their own values and override patient choice, they withhold or
withdraw treatment that a patient desires. For example, in the nurs-
ing home study examining adherence to living wills, seventy-five per-
cent of the overrides of the patient's choice resulted in denial of
treatment that had been requested in the living will. 9 In addition,
some skepticism is appropriate when physicians attribute life-sus-
taining decisions to fear of liability. First, there are no reported cases
of successful prosecution or suit against a physician for withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment.220 Second, physicians may simply prefer to
attribute their reluctance to carry out patient wishes to a "neutral"
explanation like the law, rather than to disclose that their objection
really stems from personal philosophical views. It is often easier to
deal with moral conflicts by couching disagreements in morally neu-
tral terms.
3. Futility of End-of-Life Care.-Physicians might override patient
choices and ignore patient values because they are exercising what
they feel is their right to reject patient demands for treatment that is
medically futile. 221 This theory would explain why patients are denied
treatment that they desire, but would not explain the provision of
214. NIH Consensus Development Panel on Gallstones and Laparoscopic Cholecystec-
tomy, Gallstones and Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, 269 JAMA 1018, 1018 (1993).
215. Id.
216. Barak Gaster, The Learning Curve, 270 JAMA 1280 (1993).
217. Orentlicher, supra note 33, at 2446.
218. Zinberg, supra note 60, at 479-81.
219. Danis et al., supra note 161, at 884-85.
220. See Orentlicher, supra note 33, at 2446; Weir & Gostin, supra note 59, at 1852.
221. Guidelines, supra note 80, at 1870.
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services that are undesired. Even if perceived medical futility ex-
plained most cases in which physicians overrode patient values, how-
ever, the overrides still reflect the imposition of physician values.
Judgments about futility almost never reflect impersonal opinions that
no medical benefit is possible; rather, they reflect personal value judg-
ments that the benefits of treatment are not worth their costs. 222 For
example, when Helga Wanglie's family requested that she be main-
tained on a ventilator, despite her permanently unconscious state, her
physicians argued that there was no medical benefit to be gained by
keeping her alive.223 Yet, the preservation of life is always a medical
benefit. To be sure, there may be reasons not to consider the preser-
vation of life a worthwhile medical benefit. For example, when health
care resources are limited, it may not make sense to spend them on
patients who will never regain consciousness. That, however, is ajudg-
ment about allocating resources, not a judgment about futility.2 24
4. Patients Do Not Want to Exercise Their Autonomy.-Some have
argued that patients really do not want to make their own medical
decisions. Although patients very much want to be fully informed
about the decisions that need to be made, it has been observed that
they ultimately want their physicians to make the decisions for
them.2 5 There is a good deal of intuitive sense to this argument.
When physicians describe treatment options and then leave the final
choice to the patient, many patients feel that the physicians are abdi-
cating their professional responsibility to exercise their medical judg-
ment.22 6 Indeed, a number of studies suggest that patients do not
want to make medical decisions,227 particularly when their illnesses
222. Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1560, 1561,
1563 (1992).
223. Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 512, 513 (1991). Ironically, Ms. Wanglie's family had to fight in court to
receive ventilatory treatment for a permanently unconscious patient while Karen Quinlan's
family previously had to fight in court to withdraw ventilatory treatment for a permanently
unconscious patient. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
224. Truog et al., supra note 222, at 1563.
225. Jack Ende et al., Measuring Patients'Desirefor Autonomy: Decision Making and Informa-
tion-Seeking Preferences Among Medical Patients, 4 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 23, 28 (1989).
226. This is my anecdotal experience from discussions with friends and family members.
227. William M. Strull et al., Do Patients Want to Participate in Medical Decision Making?,
252 JAMA 2990 (1984); David S. Krantz et al., Assessment of Preferences for Self-Treatment and
Information in Health Care, 39J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 977 (1980); Linda Pendleton
& William C. House, Preferences for Treatment Approaches in Medical Care: College Students Ver-
sus Diabetic Outpatients, 22 MED. CARE 644 (1984); Ilan B. Vertinsky et al., Measuring Con-
sumer Desire for Participation in Clinical Decision Making, 9 HEALTH SERvicES RES. 121 (1974).
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are severe."8 On the other hand, other studies indicate that patients
do in fact want to make medical decisions for themselves. 229
Ultimately, the argument that patients prefer to exercise their au-
tonomy by ceding medical decisionmaking to their physicians fails to
withstand scrutiny. First, it is not clear that the studies reaching this
conclusion are accurately measuring the patients' desires to make
medical decisions. For example, researchers in one study concluded
that patients do not want to make medical decisions by asking whether
people agreed or disagreed with statements such as: "It's almost al-
ways better to seek professional help than to try to treat yourself."
23 °
Yet, the desire for professional advice is a very different issue than the
desire to make the ultimate decision. Another study asked questions
such as whether the doctor or patient should decide "[w] hen the next
visit to check your blood pressure should be."23 Such questions may
yield misleading results because, at first glance, they seem to be clearly
technical in nature. But consider the following example. A pregnant
woman, after an appropriate discussion, agrees to delivery by cesarean
section. Her physician then asks her to decide the type of incision to
be used to pierce her abdomen. She is likely to respond that the
choice of incision is a medical decision for the physician to make.
However, if the physician informs her that a lower midline incision
gives greater exposure and can therefore accommodate a mal-
presentation or an unusually large child, but leaves a noticeable scar,
while a transverse abdominal incision leaves no noticeable scar but
gives less exposure, she is much more likely to want to make the
decision herself. Indeed, patient preference for a better cosmetic re-
sult has led obstetricians to use the transverse abdominal incision
more frequently. 233
Studies by John Wennberg and others suggest that, when given
enough information to fully understand the issues at stake, patients
do want to make medical decisions.2 34 To accommodate patients,
228. Ende et al., supra note 225, at 26-27.
229. Barrie R. Cassileth et al., Information and Participation Preferences Among Cancer Pa-
tients, 92 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 832 (1980); Ruth R. Faden et al., Disclosure of Information to
Patients in Medical Car 19 MED. CARE 718 (1981); Marie R. Haug & Bebe Lavin, Practitioner
or Patient-Who's in Charge?, 22J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 212 (1981).
230. Krantz et al., supra note 227, at 980.
231. Ende et al., supra note 225, at 29.
232. Richard Depp, Cesarean Delivery and Other Surgical Procedures, in OBsTETRIcS: NOR-
MAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 635, 643 (Steven G. Gabbe et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991).
233. LEoJ. DUNN, CESAREAN SECTION AND OTHER OBSTETRIC OPERATIONS IN DANFORTH'S
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 639, 644 (James R. Scott et al. eds., 6th ed. 1990).
234. Joseph F. Kasper et al., Developing Shared Decision-Making Programs to Improve the Qual-
ity of Health Core, 4 QUALrIY REV. BULL. 183 (1992).
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Wennberg and his colleagues have pioneered the concept of "shared
decision-making programs." As part of the programs, physicians give
patients interactive video programs that present detailed information
about their treatment alternatives and include outcome probabilities
for the different types of treatments based on the patient's specific
characteristics. 5 Patients who use the shared decisionmaking pro-
grams generally take more control over their medical decisions. For
example, preliminary data indicate that the use of the programs with
prostate-surgery candidates results in a forty-four to sixty. percent re-
duction in the rate of surgery. 36 In short, in the studies that suggest
that patients have little desire to make medical decisions, the patients
probably did not realize that seemingly technical questions are in fact
intrinsically value laden. If they had realized this, the studies likely
would have come out differently.
One important study, however, strongly suggests that many pa-
tients prefer to cede some of their decisionmaking authority.23 7 In
this study, patients receiving chronic kidney dialysis treatment were
asked whether they would want the dialysis continued if they devel-
oped advanced Alzheimer's disease.23" The patients were then asked
"how much leeway their physician and surrogate should have to over-
ride ... [their decision] if overriding were in their best interests."23 9
While thirty-nine percent of the patients would give no leeway, thirty-
one percent would give complete leeway and the remaining thirty per-
cent would give intermediate degrees of leeway to their surrogates and
physicians to override their own decision.240
There are two weaknesses to this study. First, of the patients who
would permit overrides, it is unclear whether they were giving author-
ity primarily to their surrogate or to their physician since they were
only asked how much leeway they would want their surrogate and phy-
sician to have.241 Second and more importantly, it is unclear how pa-
tients interpreted "best interests." 24 2 Presumably, they had some
concept of an objective judgment as to the best treatment for them. If
235. Id. at 183. With patient-specific outcome probabilities, a patient would be given,
for example, an individual figure for the likelihood that prostate surgery would relieve his
specific symptoms, rather than an average figure that would apply to a large group of men
with similar symptoms. Id.
236. Id. at 184.
237. See Sehgal et al., supra note 157, at 59-63 (concluding that not all patients prefer to
have their advance directives strictly followed).
238. Id. at 60.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 61.
241. Id. at 60.
242. Id.
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the patients envisioned an objective judgment, however, their re-
sponses did not take into account the possible imposition of someone
else's values. Thus, even this study does not provide physicians with a
defense for basing treatment decisions on their own values, rather
than on the values of the patient.
5. Patients Lack Authority.-To a certain extent, physicians ap-
pear to believe that patient preferences can be justifiably ignored on
the ground that patients lack appropriate authority. There are two
possible reasons for this view. First, physicians may simply believe
that, because patients lack medical training and expertise, they are
not capable of making the kinds of complex medical decisions that
arise with life-sustaining treatment. Indeed, studies have found that
many physicians question the ability of patients to participate mean-
ingfully in any medical decisionmaking at the end of life. 43 Although
this belief may explain some physician behavior, it does not justify
such behavior. As discussed below, decisions regarding life-sustaining
treatment are inherently value-laden and do not require medical
knowledge.
Second, when patients have lost decisionmaking capacity, physi-
cians may take the view that the patients have different interests than
their previously competent selves and that the preferences expressed
by the patient while competent should not be implemented when they
would undermine the best interests of the currently incompetent pa-
tient. 2 4 4 For example, a person may have written in a living will that
all life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn in the event of ad-
vanced dementia. At that time, the person may have felt that there is
no value to life when it is no longer possible to read, converse, or even
recognize friends and family. After reaching his or her demented
state, however, the patient might seem happy and content, respond-
ing with smiles to various activities or stimuli. If the patient seems to
gain pleasure from life and experiences little suffering, then it would
seem to be in the patient's best interests to maintain life-sustaining
treatment. This view is supported by the study of dialysis patients,
243. See, e.g., Kent W. Davidson et al., Physicians'Attitudes on Advance Directives, 262 JAMA
2415, 2416 Table 3 (1989) (indicating that 58.8% of responding doctors strongly agreed
that "[a] potential problem with advance directives is that patients could change their
minds about 'heroic' treatment after becoming terminally ill" and 32.4% strongly agreed
that "[t]he training and experience of physicians gives them greater authority than patients
in decisions about withholding 'heroic' treatment").
244. Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions
for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE
234, 240-41 (1989).
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many of whom indicated that they wanted their decisions overridden
if to do so was in their best interests. 2
45
In addition, there is some empirical evidence that healthy pa-
tients underestimate the quality of life that comes with having a disa-
bling condition. For example, cancer of the rectum is usually treated
with surgical therapy, but for some patients radiation therapy is an
alternative approach. 4 6 If surgical therapy is used, the patient ends
up with a colostomy. With radiation therapy, a colostomy is not neces-
sary.247 In a study of patient values, researchers found that patients
who had received radiation therapy perceived the quality of life with a
colostomy as lower than did the patients who had received surgical
therapy and were living with a colostomy.
248
These data demonstrate the need for better patient education.
The studies of Wennberg and others2 49 indicate that effective educa-
tional methods can greatly enhance patient understanding of the im-
plications of alternative medical treatment options.
I will not try to settle the debate regarding whether an incompe-
tent patient's treatment should be guided by the patient's previous
instructions or the patient's current best interests. Even if we accept
the best interests argument, it only provides support for overriding
the patient's preferences. It does not support substituting the physi-
cians' preferences for those of the patient.
6. Preservation of Professional Authority. -The real explanation for
the dominance of physician values in end-of-life decisions seems to be
a professional resistance to a loss of authority. If patient autonomy is
taken seriously, its impact will extend far beyond end-of-life decisions.
Every medical decision, from prescribing an antibiotic to performing
bypass surgery, ultimately comes down to a balancing of benefits and
detriments.2 1  Medical decisions based on such balancings do not re-
quire any particular medical expertise and therefore could be made
by patients based on their personal benefit and risk preferences. In
245. Sehgal et al., supra note 157, at 61.
246. Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis? 10 MED. DECISION MAK-
ING 58, 60 (1990).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 63, 65. These differences could not be explained on the grounds that pa-
tients who did not want a colostomy chose radiation therapy and patients who did not
mind a colostomy chose surgical therapy. The decision to use radiation therapy was gener-
ally not made on the basis of patient preferences. Id. at 65-66.
249. See supra notes 234-236 and accompanying text.
250. See Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody, Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264
JAMA 1276, 1277 (1990) (asserting that every medical determination involves a judgment
regarding the potential harms and benefits of intervention).
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other words, if we take seriously the principle that only patients have
the right to decide which benefits are worthwhile and which risks are
too serious, then it is not clear what authority physicians have to de-
cide when a treatment should or should not be provided. Indeed, a
survey of physicians in California and Vermont suggests that many
physicians object to advance directives because they believe advance
directives will curtail physician control of treatment decisions. 251
The following example illustrates the issue regarding physician
authority. Until recently, medical textbooks included the standard
recommendation that physicians offer amniocentesis to check for
Down syndrome to women with no family history of the syndrome
only if the women were thirty-five or over.252 While several factors
contributed to this recommendation, one of the most important was
the view that amniocentesis made sense only when the risk of having a
Down syndrome child was comparable to the risk that the amni-
ocentesis would cause the pregnancy to abort.53 However, women
who have strong feelings against having a Down syndrome child might
choose amniocentesis even if the risk of an abortion from the proce-
dure was several times greater than the risk of having a Down syn-
drome child without the procedure. 254 These women might reason
that, even if they lose a fetus from the amniocentesis, they can always
become pregnant again. Whether this is a reasonable choice cannot
be settled by appealing to any principles derived from medical
knowledge.
Consideration of two other examples leads to the same conclu-
sion. The first example is that of coronary artery bypass surgery. Be-
cause of concern that many bypass surgeries were being performed
unnecessarily, the American College of Cardiology and American
Heart Association convened an expert panel to develop guidelines for
251. Zinberg, supra note 60, at 482.
252. PRESIOENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDI-
TIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC SCREENING,
COUNSELING, AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS 75, 76 (1983) [hereinafter SCREENING AND COUN-
SELING]. Some textbooks still include this recommendation. See, e.g., Joe L. Simpson, Ge-
netic Counseling and Prenatal Diagnosis, in OBSTETRICS, NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES
269, 278 (Steven G. Gabbe et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991) ("[Genetic] screening is now offered
routinely for.., women aged 35 years or older to detect... Down Syndrome.").
253. SCREENING AND COUNSELING, supra note 252, at 77. In other words, there are two
significant risks being balanced. The risk of not doing an amniocentesis and giving birth
to a Down syndrome baby, and the risk of doing an amniocentesis and losing a normal
fetus through iatrogenic abortion. Id. at 80.
254. Id.
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the use of bypass surgery.2 5  The panel concluded that physicians
should offer bypass surgery to patients only if the surgery could pro-
vide longer survival or less compromise of wellbeing2 56 than medical
therapy. Like the policy for amniocentesis, this restriction on bypass
surgery reflects a nonmedical value judgment. Some patients might
prefer surgery to medical therapy, even if there is no difference in
outcome, because of the inconvenience of daily medical therapy. A
similar value judgment underlies the consensus guidelines for coro-
nary angioplasty. 257 The panel for angioplasty concluded physicians
should not offer the procedure when the chances of success are less
than sixty percent.258 Yet, medical expertise does not dictate that a
sixty percent cutoff rate should be used, rather than a fifty percent or
seventy percent cutoff rate.
In sum, it is not surprising that end-of-life treatment decisions
largely reflect physician rather than patient values. Physicians rou-
tinely make value judgments when making medical judgments. To
yield to patient values in end-of-life decisions would require a radical
change in the way physicians practice medicine. This is not to suggest
that there is anything unseemly about physicians imposing their own
values. In imposing their values, physicians are trying to ensure that
the patient receives the best possible outcome. The problem, as indi-
cated, is that the best possible outcome can only be determined by the
patient's values.
Some commentators have argued that an obligation to respect
patient values would require physicians to compromise their profes-
sional values and that principles of patient self-determination do not
necessarily require such a compromise.25 9 When treatment provides
no medical benefit-a rare occurrence-this argument may be
255. ACC/AHA Task Force, Subcommittee on Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery,
Guidelines and Indications for Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery: A Report of the American
College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on Assessment of Diagnostic and Thera-
peutic Cardiovascular Procedures, 17J. Am. C. CARDIOLOGY 543 (1991).
256. Compromise of wellbeing is measured by frequency and magnitude of chest pain
or shortness of breath and the degree to which the patient's ability to engage in exercise or
other physical exertion is limited.
257. See ACC/AHA Task Force, Subcommittee on Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary
Angioplasty, Guidelines for Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty: A Report of the
American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on Assessment of Diagnostic
and Therapeutic Cardiovascular Procedures, 12J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 529 (1988) (outlining a
series of recommendations and guidelines for the use of coronary angioplasty).
258. Id. at 538-42.
259. See Frank A. Chervanak & Laurence B. McCullough, Justified Limits on Refusing Inter-
vention, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 12, 13-15 (arguing that a patient's de-
mand for alternative medical intervention may be unreasonable because it is inconsistent
with that patient's best interests and asserting that physicians can preserve their profes-
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valid. 2" In the vast majority of cases, it is not. There are only three
potential bases for taking the decision away from the patient: (1) a
physician's treatment decision reflects the patient's best interest; (2)
health care resources are scarce and abiding by a patient's directive
may deprive others of health care; and (3) the physician has conscien-
tious objections to carrying out the patient's wishes. None of these
justifies substituting physicians' values for patients' values. With re-
gard to the first, principles of self-determination make clear that pa-
tients are in the best position to determine their best interests.
Physicians therefore have no legitimate justification for overriding the
patient on the basis of the patient's best interests. Although there are
limits on the kinds of risks that society allows people to assume, there
is no reason why physicians should decide which medical risks are too
great for the patient to assume any more than they should decide
which environmental or workplace risks are too great for people to
assume. Similarly, while it may not be appropriate for an incompetent
patient's treatment to be determined by the previously competent
self, why should physicians-as opposed to family members-have the
authority to decide what is in a patient's best interests? In short, there
may be a best interests argument for overriding patient values; it, how-
ever, is not an argument for substituting physician values.
Likewise, although it is true that society cannot provide every pa-
tient with every beneficial treatment and that someone must decide
which treatments will be available and which will not, these choices
should not be based on the personal preferences of physicians. Physi-
cians agree: they traditionally have rejected bedside rationing on the
ground that allocation decisions should be made on a societal level,
sional values in such a situation with strategies designed to educate the patient about why
their preference is unreasonable from a clinical perspective).
260. See generally Truog et al., supra note 222, at 1560-63 (discussing the meaning of
futility when discussed in connection with medical treatment). The debate about the
meaning of futility is an important one, though beyond the scope of this Article; see also
Leslie J. Blackhall, Must We Always Use CPR?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1281, 1282 (1987)
(asking whether a physician is obligated to perform CPR on a patient who wants it when
the physician believes that CPR will not be beneficial and may be harmful); See Guidelines,
supra note 80, at 1869 ("The frequent performance of CPR on patients who are terminally
ill or who have little change of surviving for more than a brief period of time has promoted
concern that resuscitation efforts may be employed too broadly."); John D. Lantos et al.,
The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, 87 AM. J. MED. 81, 81-84 (1989) (discussing the
implications of the claim that a medical treatment is futile); Lawrence J. Schneiderman et
al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTRNAL MED. 949, 949
(1990) ("[W]e propose that when physicians conclude ... that in the last 100 cases a medi-
cal treatment has been useless, they should regard that treatment as futile."); Tomlinson &
Brody, supra note 250, at 1276-80 (arguing in support of futility judgments).
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rather than an individual level. 26' To maintain patient trust, physi-
cians must remain advocates for their patients, not divide their loyal-
ties between their patients and society.26 2 Moreover, if physicians
make rationing decisions on an individual basis, the decisions will re-
flect their own biases rather than the shared values of society as a
whole.
Finally, even a physician's valid conscientious objections to a
course of treatment 263 does not justify the physician interjecting her
values to override a patient's treatment decision. If a physician has a
261. See Norman G. Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573, 1575
(1984) ("[lit is society, not the individual practitioners, that must make the decision to
limit the availability of effective but expensive types of medical care.").
262. See id. at 1574 (arguing that physicians who withhold treatment because they be-
lieve it is wasteful lose the faith of their patients).
263. In many cases, physicians may simply disagree about the moral acceptability of a
proposed course of action. For example, although ethicists consider the withholding and
withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment to be morally equivalent, many physicians believe
that it is less acceptable to withdraw than to withhold life-sustaining care. See Council on
Ethical andJudicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267
JAMA 2229 (1992) [hereinafter Decisions] ("There is . . . no ethical distinction between
withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining treatment."); see also Caralis & Hammond,
supra note 165, at 688 ("[I] n this group of physicians and students, the clear majority (73%)
feel that withdrawing treatment is different than withholding.. ."); Mildred Z. Solomon et
al., Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional Views on Life-Sustaining Treatments, 83 Am. J.
PUB. HEALTH 14, 19 (1993) ("Most [physicians] ... asserted that withdrawing treatment is
ethically different than deciding not to initiate treatment."). Physicians also seem to per-
ceive a distinction in the law between withholding and withdrawing care, Philip G. Peters,
Jr. et al., Physician Willingness to Withhold Tube Feeding After Cruzan: An Empirical Study, 57
Mo. L. REv. 831, 838-39 (1992), even though there is no such distinction. Meisel, supra
note 33, at 1499 ("It is sometimes said that although it might be permissible not to start a
particular treatment for a critically ill patient, once begun, it is impossible to stop .... [I]t
is a myth that there is a legal requirement to continue treatment if it is properly refused.").
In one study, only 59% of the physicians reported that they would carry out a ventilator-
dependent patient's request to have the ventilator turned off, even though 98% of the
physicians stated that they would agree not to place the patient on the ventilator in the first
place if the patient did not want ventilatory treatment. Terr R. Fried et al., Limits of Patient
Autonomy: Physician Attitudes and Practices Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatments and Euthana-
sia, 153 ARCHiVES INTERNAL MED. 722, 723-24 (1993). Physicians also seem to disagree with
the dominant ethical view that the patient's refusal of life-sustaining treatment should be
respected regardless of the kind of treatment and regardless of whether the treatment
involves a ventilator or a feeding tube. Decisions, supa, at 2230-31 (asserting that the deci-
sion of whether life-sustaining treatment should be initiated or maintained depends on the
patient's problems, not the nature of the treatment). In one study, physicians were more
willing to withhold CPR, ventilation, or surgery than antibiotics or feeding tubes. Mower &
Baraff, supra note 126, at 380 Table 3. In another study, more than 35% of physicians
agreed with the proposition that "'even if life supports such as mechanical ventilation and
dialysis are stopped, food and water should always be continued.'" Solomon et al., supra at
18 Table 4. The researchers found that the reluctance to discontinue feeding and hydra-
tion would not have been different if the proposition had used the language "medically
supplied nutrition and hydration" rather than "food and water." Id. at 18.
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moral or ethical objection to carrying out a patient's wishes, the physi-
cian should transfer care of the patient to someone who does not.2 4
Any other course of conduct would inevitably lead to treatment in
contravention of the patients' directives.265
In sum, physicians seem unwilling to respect patient values and
choice for the main reason that they desire to preserve professional
authority. This, however, is not a valid justification for doing so.
While there must be some limits to patient choice, those limits should
be set by society as a whole, not by individual physicians.
C. Conflicting Evidence
If physicians are imposing their own values in end-of-life decisionmak-
ing, it is difficult to explain why today's decisions seem to be made
differently than in the past. For example, today life-sustaining treat-
ments are being withdrawn when in the past they would have been
imposed on patients.266 According to one recent study, from 1988 to
1990 almost twice as many intensive care unit patients had do not re-
suscitate orders as did patients from 1979 to 1982.267 Patients and
physicians may suggest this phenomenon indicates that, today, treat-
ment decisions are based on patient values despite physician disagree-
ment. Rather than indicating a heightened physician respect for
patient values, however, the evidence demonstrating changes in treat-
ment decisions may indicate a change in physician values. Patients
may be receiving less aggressive care at the end of life because physi-
cians are less inclined to see value in such care. Indeed, as Daniel
Callahan has observed, end-of-life treatments often follow a trend of
first being mandatory, then becoming optional, and finally becoming
unavailable.26 In other words, certain treatments at first are imposed
264. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613 (1994) (allowing a health care provider
to decline to carry out the instruction of a health care agent or surrogate as long as the
provider makes every reasonable effort to transfer the patient to another health care
provider).
265. There may be a small percentage of cases in which the physician objects to provid-
ing care on the grounds that to do so would be inhumane.
266. See Robert L. Jayes et al., Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in Intensive Care Units: Current
Practices and Recent Changes, 270 JAMA 2213, 2215 (1993) (discussing the increases in the
frequency of do not resuscitate orders).
267. Id.
268. See Daniel Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, HASTINGS CENrrI REP., Oct. 1983, at 22,
22 (asserting that in 1973 it was uncommon to turn off respirators, but that in 1983, when
the respirator does the patient no good, it was often discontinued).
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on patients and then ultimately come to be denied to patients, regard-
less of the preferences of the patient or the patient's family. 269
For example, at one time, there was automatic treatment for pa-
tients who had lost all brain function but whose heart function could
be maintained.270 Then it became permissible to discontinue life-sus-
taining treatment from such patients. Now these patients are consid-
ered legally dead,2 71 and treatment to maintain heart function is
denied even when families request continuation of treatment.
272
Treatment for cardiac arrest has undergone a similar progression. At
one time, when a patient's heart ceased beating, CPR was automati-
cally administered. However, because many of these patients cannot
be resuscitated, or, if they can, they may live for only a brief time and
with a poor quality of life, DNR orders were developed so patients
could decline CPR.273 Now, many patients are not even offered CPR,
on the ground that CPR is futile. 2 74
Perhaps the most striking progression has occurred in the treat-
ment of patients in persistent vegetative states or other permanently
unconscious conditions. In In re Quinlan,275 the New Jersey Supreme
Court granted an unconscious patient's physician, with the concur-
rence of the patient's family, permission to turn off the ventilator that
was keeping the unconscious woman alive.276 Before In re Quinlan,
however, it was generally assumed that such patients must be given
life-sustaining, ventilatory treatment.277 Since then, patients and fami-
lies have had the authority to decline ventilators. Currently, there is a
vigorous movement to declare ventilators unavailable for permanently
unconscious patients. For example, in 1991, a Minneapolis hospital
269. Id. (indicating that today respirators are routinely turned off even if the patient's
family wants the treatment continued).
270. Id.
271. See In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 737-38 (Wash. 1980) (noting that at least 25 state
legislatures adopted brain death as the standard of death and holding that a person who
has sustained irreversible cessation of brain functions is legally dead).
272. See Callahan, supra note 268, at 22 ("It is no longer customary to allow a person who
has suffered brain death of the whole brain to be maintained on a respirator simply be-
cause the family wants that done."). Under NewJersey law, however, patients are entitled
to treatment after brain death if the desire for treatment is motivated by religious reasons.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-5 (Supp. 1993).
273. SeeJayes et al., supra note 266, at 2213-17 (discussing the history of DNR orders and
their increased use).
274. See id. at 2216 (suggesting that the increase in the use of DNR orders indicates that
physicians and families are setting limits to therapy in cases when a poor outcome is likely).
275. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
276. Id. at 671-72.
277. See Callahan, supra note 268, at 22 (discussing how, before Quinlan, it was uncom-
mon to turn off respirators).
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went to court unsuccessfully to disconnect a ventilator from a perma-
nently unconscious patient over the family's objections. 78 Many com-
mentators also have argued that all life-sustaining treatment should be
withheld or withdrawn from permanently unconscious patients, either
because the treatment is futile279 or because the patients should be
considered dead.2
80
In short, while patients today are less likely to receive certain
kinds of end-of-life care than patients ten or twenty years ago, the
change in treatment more likely reflects changes in physicians' values
than a greater respect by physicians for patients' values.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
A. Reform the Laws
Should we abolish advance directive statutes because of their ten-
dency to mislead patients about their rights? While there might be
good theoretical reasons for doing so, this is not a practical solution.
The statutes are too well-established within our legal system for there
to be any likelihood of their revocation. They could, however, be im-
proved by amending them to correct their ambiguous, unconstitu-
tional or otherwise problematic provisions. Additionally, health care
surrogate acts should be passed in all states. Because it is unrealistic
to expect that advance directives will become common place, there
must be a default regime for patients without directives, just as we
have a regime of default rules for people who die intestate.8
The new Uniform Health Care Decisions Act provides an excel-
lent model for both advance directive and surrogate laws with its uni-
tary statutory.approach.282 In particular, the Act responds to the lack
of written documentation of patient wishes by expressly recognizing
278. Miles, supra note 223, at 512-15. In the case, the family of an 85-year-old woman
insisted on continued life support treatment even though many health care professionals
had determined that the woman was at the end of her life and that the respirator was
nonbeneficial. Id. at 513. The court appointed the woman's husband as her representa-
tive and refused to rule on the legality of a stop treatment order, noting that the husband
had not made a stop treatment request. Id.
279. Schneiderman et al., supra note 260, at 949 (arguing that physicians should with-
hold treatment that they deem to be futile).
280. See generally StuartJ. Youngner & Edward T. Bartlett, Human Death and High Technol-
ogy: The Failure of the Whole-Brain Formulation, 99 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 252 (1983).
281. James Lindgren, Death by Default, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 195 (1993).
282. See Charles P. Sabatino, The New Uniform Health Care Decisions Act: Paving a Health
Decisions Superhighway?, 53 MD. L. Rv. 1238, 1254 (1994) ("Perhaps the most compelling
fact in favor of acceptance of the Uniform Act is the fragmentation and variability of state
health decisions law.").
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that oral instructions are just as valid as written instructions.2 s3 In ad-
dition, the Act does not have limitations according to patient diagno-
sis or type of treatment, 284 it acknowledges close friends as potential
surrogate decisionmakers,28 5 and it expressly recognizes advance di-
rectives executed outside of the state.28 6
As indicated previously, however, not all of the problems will be
addressed by even the best set of end-of-life statutes. We will still have
to deal with the problem of physicians imposing their own values.
The following recommendations address that concern.
B. Acknowledgement and Discussion
Physicians simply may not recognize the extent to which they are
injecting their values into the decisionmaking process. Studies sug-
gest that physicians believe that they are implementing their patients'
preferences even when implementing their own. 287 Therefore, a re-
newed focus on patient autonomy during medical school instruction,
postgraduate training, and continuing medical education should im-
prove end-of-life decisionmaking. While ethics instruction is much
more common than in the past,288 it is still at the periphery of medical
education and is usually concentrated in the first two years of medical
school. 89
Education alone will never be a sufficient answer. If it were, the
more than two decades of emphasis on patient rights of self-determi-
nation would have changed physician behavior by now. Experience
has repeatedly shown that changes in the behavior of physicians (or
other persons) does not occur from the dissemination of information
alone. Rather, the dissemination of information must be accompa-
nied by financial incentives, regulatory mandates, or encouragement
by trusted, local opinion leaders.2 90 Accordingly, the next two recom-
mendations exploit the effectiveness of financial incentives and regu-
latory mandates.
283. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS AcT § 2(a) (1993). The Act, however, inexplicably
fails to recognize oral proxy appointments. Id. § 2(b).
284. Id., §§ 2, 4-5.
285. Id. § 5(c).
286. Id. § 2(h).
287. Uhlmann et al., supra note 72, at M117; Schneiderman et al., Do Physicians' Own
Preferences, supra note 77, at 29.
288. Edmund D. Pellegrino et al., Relevance and Utility of Courses in Medical Ethics: A Sur-
vey of Physicians'Perceptions, 253 JAMA 49, 49 (1985).
289. Id.; Daniel P. Sulmasy et al., Medical House Officers' Knowledge, Attitudes, and Confi-
dence Regarding Medical Ethics, 150 ARCHnws INrERNAL MED. 2509, 2509 (1990).
290. This point is developed at length in David Orenticher, The Influence of a Professional
Organization on Physician Behavior, 57 ALBANY L. REv. 583, 591-605 (1994).
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C. Physician Payment Reform
To the extent that physician ignorance of patient preferences
and values reflects inadequate compensation for time spent talking to
patients, payment reform could have an important impact. Currently,
physicians are discouraged from learning their patients' views because
they are not compensated for doing so. Higher reimbursement rates
for discussions about end-of-life care would undoubtedly lead to more
discussion. This could be accomplished by compensating physicians
based on time spent with the patient, rather than on whether they
performed an invasive procedure.291
D. Strengthen Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent
Because principles of informed consent are not seriously en-
forced by the law in other contexts, 9 2 it is not surprising that physi-
cians are insufficiently respectful of patient preferences in the context
of end-of-life decisions. Currently, there is little force to the legal doc-
trine of informed consent. For example, a suit for lack of informed
consent will succeed only if physical injury occurs. 9 3 Therefore, if a
patient is not warned of a significant risk and the risk does not materi-
alize, a legal cause of action does not even arise. Yet, even without
physical injury, this patient has been wronged. 94 Since the risks usu-
ally will not materialize and patients rarely sue even when they are
injured by malpractice,295 there is little deterrent effect to informed
consent law.
The deterrent effect is also weakened because liability exists only
if a "reasonable" patient given greater information would have made a
decision different than that made by the patient.2 96 Since most medi-
cal treatments are widely accepted, however, it is extremely difficult to
show that a "reasonable" patient would have refused the physician's
recommendation to accept the treatment. Further, the reasonable pa-
tient standard ignores the fundamental principle of self-determina-
291. See generally Tom J. Wachtel & Michael D. Stein, Fee-for-Time System: A Conceptual
Framework for an Incentive-Neutral Method of Physician Payment, 270 JAMA 1226 (1993).
292. SeeJAY KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48-84 (1984) ("The legal
vision of informed consent, based on self-determination, is still largely a mirage.").
293. DAVID W. LouISELL & HAROLD WiujIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACnCE 1 22.01 (1989).
294. Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the
Law of Informed Consent, 16 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 210 (1988).
295. SeeA. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due
to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245, 245
(1991) (finding in one study that only 8 of 260 patients who had adverse events caused by
medical malpractice filed claims).
296. LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 293, at 22.13.
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tion: that each patient's values should be respected no matter how
idiosyncratic.
There are three important ways that informed consent law could
be strengthened. First, a violation of informed consent law could be
found when there is a failure to disclose information material to the
individual patient. Second, patients could be given a dignitary cause
of action for violation of informed consent law even if there is no
bodily harm suffered.297 Third, medical licensing boards could exer-
cise their authority to discipline physicians for violations of profes-
sional standards of conduct by penalizing breaches of informed
consent.
2 9 8
E. Physicians Should Distribute Values Histories
While all efforts should be made to persuade physicians to honor
patient values, it will take time for physician behavior to change. In
addition, as discussed, it may not always be possible for physicians to
discern their patients' preferences. 299 Therefore, patients should take
it upon themselves to inquire about their physicians' values when
choosing their primary care physicians.300 If patients choose physi-
cians whose values coincide with their own, it is much more likely that
treatment decisions will coincide with the patient's values and
preferences.
Patients can discover their physicians' values by simply inquiring
about them. In addition, this process could be facilitated if physicians
prepare their own values histories or other detailed advance directive
forms and distribute them to current and prospective patients. In-
deed, since end-of-life decisions tend to accord more with physician
values than patient values, 01 patient self-determination might be bet-
ter facilitated if patients chose physicians according to the physicians'
values rather than assuming that their preferences would be followed
by any physician whom they chose.
In addition, there are other benefits to be gained by-relying on
physician rather than patient documentation of values and treatment
preferences. Since most patients will never complete an advance di-
297. See Meisel, supra note 294, at 216 ("Perhaps the recognition of a cause of action for
the dignitary affront of nondisclosure unaccompanied by bodily injury will help the law of
informed consent to approximate more nearly the idea of informed consent.").
298. Wendy K. Mariner, Informed Consent in the Post-Modern Era, 13 LAw & SOCIAL INQUIRY
385, 404 (1988).
299. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
300. I am indebted to Professor Robert Aronson of the University of Washington School
of Law for this point.
301. See supra notes 159-210 and accompanying text.
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rective, use of physician documentation will cover a higher percentage
of patient-physician relationships. Second, physician documentation
is likely to be more reliable than patient documentation. Since physi-
cians have a greater familiarity with the course of serious illnesses and
the advantages and disadvantages of various medical treatments, their
treatment preferences are more likely to be effective in fulfilling their
wishes. A patient, on the other hand, is more likely to choose or re-
fuse a treatment due to a misunderstanding about the benefits and
risks of the treatment.
Having patients consider their physicians' values and preferences
would not require a complete overhaul in physician-patient relations.
It is already common for some patients to consider whether a physi-
cian takes an aggressive or a conservative approach to treating medical
problems. But because patients are not accustomed to questioning
their physicians about their values and may be uncomfortable with the
idea, it is important that physicians volunteer the information and not
wait for their patients to request it.
CONCLUSION
It is natural for lawyers and legislatures to respond to social
problems with legal solutions. And, the public has benefited from
legal activity in end-of-life decisionmaking. Nevertheless, when end-
of-life decisions fail to correspond to patient preferences, the primary
problem is not the absence of an end-of-life statute or the existence of
a poorly drafted statute. Rather, the failure reflects more deeply
rooted problems, particularly that end-of-life decisions, like other
medical decisions, are driven primarily by physician preferences and
values, rather than patient preferences and values. Until the domi-
nance of physician values is addressed, no end-of-life statute can en-
sure that patient wishes will be fulfilled.
